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5Monetary and Fiscal Policies: 
Ordinary Recessions and Financial Crises
Svetoslav Semov
Abstract
This paper uses two different samples to study the effects of monetary and fiscal 
policies on the profiles of recessions and recoveries. Several results emerge 
from the econometric analysis presented. First, monetary policy during ordinary 
recessions and banking crises is a powerful tool with lasting effects that extend 
to recovery growth rates. However, the effect of monetary policy during financial 
crises is strongly diminished in the case of forbearance – banks left to function 
despite being technically insolvent. Second, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is 
reversed – it is a powerful tool during banking crises, but it does not seem to 
significantly affect recovery growth rates during ordinary recessions. Finally, 
the policy response during past financial crisis does not seem to be particularly 
expansionary – on the contrary, fiscal policy is markedly procylcical, while 
monetary policy is neutral. This is proposed as an alternative explanation to the 
one usually given for the sluggishness of financial crises. 
  
I. Introduction
The Global Recession of 2008-09 sparked renewed interest in systemic 
financial crises. A key observation, first documented by Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
was that recessions associated with financial crises turn out to be particularly severe 
and protracted (1999). Most of the work on financial crises has concentrated on 
real-economy variables like output loss, length, depth etc. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009; Kannan, 2010; Claessens et al., 2004). The role of monetary and fiscal 
policies in financial crises has not been extensively studied with the exception 
of a 15-country study in the latest issue of the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 
2009). It is possible that inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies are one 
reason why recoveries associated with financial crises turn out to be particularly 
severe. In addition, it might be that in those cases in which monetary policy was 
appropriately used, its effectiveness was diminished because the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism was impaired as a result of the stress in the banking 
system (IMF, 2009a).
6This paper attempts to empirically evaluate the effect of monetary and 
fiscal policies in financial crises on the duration of the recession and the strength 
of the recovery. It further tries to examine if the effectiveness of monetary policy is 
dependent on the implementation of financial reforms. As a benchmark, recessions 
are employed to evaluate the normal impact of monetary and fiscal policies on 
recovery growth rates. Several results emerge from the econometric analysis 
presented. First, expansionary monetary policy during ordinary recessions is a 
powerful tool with lasting effects that extend to recovery growth rates. However, 
fiscal policy does not seem to affect post-crisis growth. Second, expansionary 
monetary policy during financial crises still has a positive but insignificant effect 
on the strength of the recovery, while expansionary fiscal policy has a positive 
and significant effect. Furthermore, these results are preserved in the analysis of 
the duration of the recession. Some empirical evidence is provided that explains 
the ineffectiveness of monetary policy by numerous cases of forbearance – 
banks left to function despite being technically insolvent. Finally, fiscal policy in 
financial crises seems to be markedly procyclical – the authorities cut government 
consumption on average by 2.5 percent of GDP during the duration of the 
downturn. Monetary policy, on the other hand, seems to be countercyclical – real 
money market rates are decreased on average by once percent during the duration 
of the downturn. 
Two different samples are used. The first one uses quarterly data for a set 
of seventy crises in nineteen developed countries to analyze the effect of the policy 
response on the duration of the downturn and recovery growth rates. The second 
one employs yearly data for a set of eighty financial crises episodes in different 
countries to do the same. In addition, the impact of forbearance on monetary policy 
is also estimated. In both cases, the goal is to use the variation in policy responses 
and outcomes to find out the relationship between the variables of interest. 
7Eight sections follow. Section II reviews other cross country studies that 
examine the profiles of recessions and recoveries associated with financial crises. 
Section III presents a graphical interpretation of a linearized New Keynesian 
model with a risk premium. Within this framework, I explain the difference 
between financial crises and ordinary recessions. Furthermore, I illustrate the 
importance of monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, in Section III, I provide 
a concise analysis of the policy response in twelve financial crises and I argue 
that non-Keynesian policies are the norm rather than the exception. Section IV 
specifies the econometric model to be used. In addition, it discusses alternative 
versions of the model that should be estimated to check for the robustness of 
results. Section V describes the data, on which the analysis will be based and its 
sources. Section VI presents evidence on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal 
policies in both ordinary recessions and financial crises and discusses the role of 
forbearance on monetary policy effectiveness. Finally, Section VII concludes and 
summarizes the results. 
II. Literature Review
This paper will attempt to add to the literature on cross-country studies of 
financial countries. Most studies examining recoveries and recessions associated 
with financial crises look at outcomes (output loss, duration of recession, 
sluggishness of recovery) without explicitly answering the question what it is 
that causes financial crises to be such protracted affairs. In addition, they do not 
include the policy response in the analysis.
For example, Reinhart and Rogoff conduct a comparative historical analysis 
of the aftermath of systemic financial crises (2008). The countries under 
consideration are both developed and emerging economies that have experienced 
financial distress in the after-war period. Reinhart and Rogoff’s analysis shows 
8deep and lasting effects on output and employment. Unemployment rises for 
five years and output declines last on average for two years following the peak 
of economic growth. This is substantially more than the length observed during 
“normal recessions”. However, the authors do not provide any explanations for 
why this might be the case. Their analysis is merely comparative.
Boysen-Hogrefe et al. use a parametric framework to test whether the size 
of the bounce-back of GDP following an ordinary recession is larger than that 
following a recession associated with a banking crisis or housing crisis. The study 
covers 16 industrialized countries from 1970 to 2006. The results indicate that 
the output loss during an ordinary recession is completely offset in the following 
recovery. This is not the case when the recession was triggered by a banking crisis 
or a housing crisis. Again, this study does not offer explanations for why this 
might be the case – it simply makes this observation. 
Kannan offers one possible reason why recoveries from banking crises 
might be more protracted (2010). Using a sample of 21 industrialized economies 
from 1970 to 2004, the author documents that it takes 5 ½ quarters for output to 
recover following a banking crises, while it takes only 3 quarters following a normal 
recession. Evidence is presented that stressed credit conditions are an important 
factor containing the pace of the recovery. Industries that are more reliant on external 
finance, or more subject to financial frictions, are found not to recover as fast as 
other industries following all kinds of recession. The author finds strong evidence 
that the differential growth patterns across industries is much more pronounced in 
the aftermath of a financial crisis than it is for other recessions. 
One potential drawback of this study is the small sample. The author 
relies on just 15 financial crisis episodes, not all of which are systemic.   
9There is another strand of literature that attempts to explain why some 
financial crises are so prolonged. This strand analyzes the effect of financial 
policies on the depth and duration of recessions. For example, Cecchetti et al. 
explore a vast array of financial policies (liquidity support, deposit freeze, blanket 
guarantee, bank holiday, forbearance etc.) and find that establishing an asset 
management company is associated with shorter recessions (2009). Furthermore, 
the authors find that forbearance is strongly associated with bigger output losses. 
Other financial policies do not seem to have a significant effect on length, depth 
and cumulative output losses during recessions associated with financial crises. 
Also, Claessens et al. find that that excessive fiscal outlays delay economic 
recovery.The fiscal outlay figure includes both fiscal and quasi-fiscal outlays for 
financial system restructuring, including the recapitalization costs for banks, bailout 
costs related to the government covering obligations due to depositors and creditors, 
and debt relief schemes for bank borrowers. Furthermore, better institutional 
framework, as characterized by less corruption and greater judicial efficiency, does 
reduce output losses, even when controlling for excessive fiscal outlays. 
In summary, the literature on financial policies might explain why some 
financial crises are so prolonged – if they were not followed by the implementation 
of the appropriate financial system reforms. 
In addition, there is another reason financial crises might turn out to be 
more sluggish than ordinary recessions – if monetary and fiscal policies were not 
appropriately used. The effect of monetary and fiscal policies is explored in the 
most recent World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2009). The authors find that monetary 
and fiscal policies tend to shorten the duration of all types of recessions. Both 
increases in government consumption and decreases of interest rates beyond what 
is warranted by a Taylor rule positively and significantly affect recovery growth 
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rates. However, when only financial crises are analyzed the effect of monetary 
policy is found not to be statistically significant. One drawback of this study is 
that the sample for banking crises is limited to only fifteen episodes in developed 
countries. This study is also related to the literature on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. If the transmission mechanism is affected, then the 
way monetary policy works could also be influenced. For example, the interest-
rate and the bank-lending channels could be hampered by the stress experienced 
by the financial system, something that might lead to reduced effectiveness of 
monetary policy (IMF, 2009a).
This paper attempts to add to the discussion of the sluggishness of 
financial crises. It will build on previous work on the effects of monetary and 
fiscal policies during banking crises (IMF, 2009).  In particular, a larger sample 
than used before will be employed to test whether the strength of the recovery and 
the duration of the recession are affected by the policy response. In addition, the 
impact of monetary policy will be examined in cases of forbearance. If the lack 
of financial reforms proves to change the effectiveness of monetary policy, then 
this might give another explanation why some countries take so long to recover 
following a banking crisis. Finally, the extent to which fiscal and monetary 
policies have been used in past financial crises is documented. 
III. Financial Crises and Past Policy Responses
Various studies analyze the link between the financial sector and the real 
economy (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke and Gertler, 2000; Kiyotaki and Moore, 
1997). In this section, I review some of the existing literature that explains 
how the financial sector can amplify output shocks, making a recession deeper 
and more prolonged. Furthermore, I use a graphical version of a linearized 
New Keynesian model that incorporates a risk premium and demonstrates the 
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difference between financial crises and ordinary recessions. Finally, I propose an 
alternative explanation for the severity of financial crises – the policy response. 
I argue that financial crises are often a time of immense political and economic 
turmoil, something that often leads to the pursuit of non-Keynesian policies. In 
addition to providing some possible explanations for the contractionary policies 
countries have undertaken during financial crises, I review, in detail, the policy 
response in twelve systemic banking crises. The episodes discussed suggest that 
both developed and developing countries have pursued non-Keynesian policies 
in the past. 
Financial Crises: Why are They Different from Ordinary Recessions? 
Some evidence has been found for Milton Friedman’s “plucking model” 
which says that cyclical contractions tend to dissipate more quickly the larger the 
size of the contraction (Sinclair, 2005). However, financial crises do not seem 
to follow this pattern. They serve as an amplification mechanism that magnifies 
and accompanies other types of shocks like exchange rate, domestic and foreign 
debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). An essential part of this amplification 
mechanism is the asymmetric information problems that arise during a financial 
crisis (Bernanke, 1983). Bernanke claims that the loss of confidence in financial 
institutions and the widespread insolvency of debtors lead to increased cost of 
credit intermediation, because banks cannot differentiate between good and bad 
borrowers. Consequently, potential worthy borrowers cannot undertake their 
projects; also savers have to devote their funds to inferior uses. As a result, there 
is a contraction in economic activity.
Bernanke and Gertler (2000) formulated a formal model that explains 
how the financial system serves as an amplification mechanism to negative shocks 
that hit the economy. The initial output shock leads to a decrease in wealth, which 
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makes firms more dependent on external financing. A weak banking system 
cannot provide that financing, leading to a decline in investment. Kiyotaki and 
Moore trace a similar dynamic in a richer intertemporal model (1997). A collapse 
in land prices undermines a firm’s collateral, something that decreases its credit 
limit. This causes it to pull back investment in assets and hurts it even more in the 
next period. 
The dynamics described above can be analyzed within an otherwise 
standard New Keynesian model that includes a risk premium. The model has the 
following equations (Clarida et al., 1999): 
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This is a linearized version of a New Keynesian model (Clarida et al., 
1999). The AS curve is derived from the Euler equation of firms. It is referred to 
as the New Keynesian Phillips curve. It shows a positive relationship between 
prices and output, because an increase in output leads to higher real marginal 
costs, which in turn make firms increase their prices. The parameters π, πe, Y
t
, Y
t
n 
represent inflation, expected inflation, output and the natural level of output (the 
level that will arise if prices are perfectly flexible). The parameter α refers to the 
fraction of sticky-price firms. The larger this fraction is, the flatter the AS curve, and 
correspondingly, the smaller change in price level economic fluctuations produce. 
The last term of the AS curve, u
t
 , is referred to as “cost push”, i.e. anything else 
that might affect marginal costs. In addition, it is a random disturbance term that 
follows an autoregressive pattern.
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 The IS curve is derived from the consumption Euler equations of 
households, that is the household’s optimal saving decision. In this equation the 
current output gap depends on expected future output, E
t
 (Y
t+1
–Y
t
n
+1
), and the 
real interest rate – (i
t
-E
t
 πt+1). Higher  expected future output raises the current 
output, because consumers want to smooth consumption, and, therefore, consume 
more today. In addition, the negative effect of the real interest rate reflects the 
intertemporal substitution of consumption.  The last term of the IS curve, g
t
, is 
a function of expected changes in government purchases relative to expected 
changes to potential output. Since g
t
 shifts the IS curve, it is interpretable as a 
demand shock (Clarida et al., 1999). Also, g
t 
is a random disturbance term that 
follows an autoregressive pattern.  
Finally, the TS curve links the real risky rate, r, and the federal funds 
rate, f. The parameter σ is the risk premium. Although, the optimization of the 
monetary authority’s loss function is not a part of the model, it implicitly enters the 
selection of the appropriate level of the federal funds rate f. The Fed’s stabilizing 
policy rule makes it offset shocks to the risk premium or to expected inflation. 
Recessions associated with financial crises can be analyzed within this 
model. More importantly, the difference between those recessions and “ordinary” 
recessions can be illustrated. In the model normal recessions are usually caused 
by a leftward shift in the IS curve – a demand shock. For example, the demand 
shock in the financial crisis of 2008 was the collapse of the housing market that 
caused residential investment and consumption to fall. During times of financial 
distress there is an additional factor at play – the risk/liquidity premium σ. A 
jump in its value shifts the TS curve up, raising real interest rates on corporate 
bonds, mortgages, and other risky assets. This is consistent with Bernanke’s 
claim that higher cost of credit intermediation leads to increased interest rates 
14
or to a curtailment of credit (1983). In the model, the increased interest rates are 
represented by the risk premium. The shift of the TS curve is also consistent with 
the lowering of borrowers’ credit limits in Kiyotaki’s model, something that also 
leads to higher interest rates (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). 
For example, at the start of the financial crisis of 2008 there was an 
uncertainty associated with the solvency of various financial institutions. Also, 
there was a huge fire sale of risky assets in an effort to raise cash. Such events 
cause the TS curve to go up (the movement of the curve could be observed in the 
equations above – as σ increases, r rises as well). An upward shift in the TS curve 
leads in turn to a decrease in investment and consumption, causing output to fall 
even further (illustrated by an upward movement along the IS curve).  The graphs 
below illustrate these dynamics:
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In step (1) the economy is undergoing a demand shock often responsible 
for ordinary recessions. In cases of financial distress, there is an additional force, 
illustrated in step (2), which is exacerbating the recession. 
This model can be further used to illustrate how the policy response 
can add to the severity of a financial crisis. Expansionary monetary policy is 
represented by downward movements along the TS curve (the Fed optimizes 
its loss function, choosing the appropriate level of f), which lead to downward 
movements along the IS curve and correspondingly to higher output. Fiscal policy 
acts through the IS curve – an increase in government spending shifts the IS 
curve to the right, leading to an increase in output. Unconventional policies, like 
measures to calm down financial markets, go through the TS curve. For example, 
stress tests of the banking system lead to a decrease in σ, the risk premium, and 
a downward shift of the TS curve. Also, quantitative easing can target the term 
premium and also shift down the TS curve. 
The model specified above is useful for distinguishing between financial 
crises and ordinary recessions. Furthermore, it illustrates the possible impact 
of monetary and fiscal policies. However, it does not differentiate between the 
effectiveness of these policies in different environments. For example, Gali (2005) 
and Eggertsson and Krugman (2010) demonstrate within a New Keynesian model 
with heterogeneous agents that during times of financial crises the number of 
credit constrained agents increases. As a result, government spending is effective 
in raising the disposal income of those agents, something that makes them spend 
more. In other words, these studies imply that fiscal policy might be more effective 
during times of financial crises.
 In addition, monetary policy might also have different effectiveness in 
various environments. For example, if the transmission mechanism is affected 
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during a financial crisis, then the way monetary policy works might change. 
The interest-rate and the bank-lending channels could be damaged by the stress 
experienced in the financial system. (IMF, 2009a). Furthermore, if the economy 
is in a liquidity trap, as during Japan’s 1997 recession, then traditional monetary 
policy instruments are also not as effective as they would be under normal 
circumstances. 
Why is the Recovery Slow?
The recovery from a financial crisis is slower than that from an ordinary recession 
for similar reasons. As Bernanke argues, it takes time to establish new or revive 
old channels of credit (1983). Furthermore, it takes time to rehabilitate borrowers. 
This last idea is further developed by Koo (2009). He argues that financial crises 
are usually connected to “balance sheet” recessions. The last can result from a 
shock to balance sheets – for example, a bubble burst – that often accompanies 
financial crises. Then, it takes time for households and businesses to repair their 
balance sheets. For example, Japan’s recovery during the “lost decade” was 
prolonged as a result of an overhang of corporate debt. Similarly, an overhang of 
household debt is probably holding down U.S. economic growth right now. 
Why has the Policy Response in Past Financial Crises not been Keynesian? 
The divergent policy responses to financial crises have their basis in the 
fundamental theoretical disagreement about the effects of stabilization policies 
that exists in the economic profession. Starting in the 1970s there was a shift in 
economic thinking led in part by Edward Prescott that resulted in the formation of 
New Classical economics. A main part of this shift was the idea that activist policies 
to fight the business cycle are undesirable. This was because recessions result 
from the rational decision of workers to work less when the economic conditions 
are less favorable and, therefore, are the natural course of events. However, there 
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were still economists who believed that recessions are caused by demand side of 
the economy – the New Keynesians. They worked to incorporate enough frictions 
into the Real Business Cycle models of New Classical economists so that they can 
bring the two camps closer together. 
As Krugman argues, during the period 1980 – 2007 the clash between 
the New Keynesians and New Classical economists was mainly on the basis of 
theory and not action, because in the U.S. there was not much need to implement 
expansionary policies, since recessions were relatively mild over that period. New 
Keynesians thought that monetary policy was sufficient in managing the business 
cycle. In contrast, New Classical economists thought that both expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policy are ineffective, but did not mind the use of monetary policy.
A case in point of why disagreements in the economics profession matter 
for policy is the recent global financial crisis. Farell (2011) argues that there were 
noticeable shifts in the policy debate and implementation in the U.S. starting in 
early 2010 that are attributable to the sovereign debt crises of Iceland and the 
Baltic states. In particular, these crises provided conservative policy makers the 
rhetorical fodder in the debate for more stringent fiscal policy. The intellectual 
support those policy makers needed was, in turn, sought from economists; and the 
disunited profession had what to offer. At the time various prominent economists 
put forward arguments against further extending the stimulus. Examples of such 
arguments are the work of Alesina and Ardagna (2010) supporting expansionary 
austerity and the work of Rogoff and Reinhart (2009) on admissible government 
debt thresholds.  
In addition to the theoretical divide responsible for different approaches 
crisis countries have undertaken in the past, there are some attractive beliefs 
among policy makers that make them pursue non-Keynesian policies in the face 
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of financial and economic turmoil. For example, such a belief is the seemingly 
logical argument that problems of excessive debt, too much private borrowing, 
cannot be solved by creating even more of it – government borrowing (Krugman 
and Eggertsson, 2010). During the Asian Financial Crisis the IMF advised some 
of the crisis-stricken countries to pursue contractionary fiscal policies following 
a similar argument. The intention was to “restore confidence” by convincing the 
markets that irresponsible behavior is a thing of the past.  For similar reasons, 
money market rates were increased and unnecessary structural reforms were 
undertaken (Krugman, 2010). Tightened monetary policy was aimed at convincing 
the markets that the pegged exchange system will be preserved. Some of the 
structural reforms had no particular connection to the crisis but they were also 
aimed at calming down the markets. A typical example of IMF-advised policies 
was what Korea did in 1997. Money market rates were raised up to 25.6 percent 
in M1, 1998. Furthermore, there was an initial tightening of fiscal polcy to rebuild 
confidence (for half a year). 
Furthermore, there might be institutional reasons for some countries’ 
inability to pursue Keynesian policies – Kaminsky et al. argue that developing 
countries face credit constraints during bad times that prevent them from borrowing 
(2004). Furthermore, developing countries tend to also follow procyclical policies 
during good times, meaning that they do not have the necessary cushion to fight 
recessions.  
Advanced countries are not immune to institutional problems. Central 
banks in some developed countries have become increasingly conservative 
in the past two decades, focusing too much on inflation, and this might have its 
consequences during severe recessions (Krugman, 2010). A recent IMF study of 25 
severe recessions in advanced economies finds that prolonged periods of economic 
weakness are associated with falling inflation rates (Meier, 2010). However, it also 
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finds that as the inflation rate goes toward zero, it becomes sticky. This means that 
a severely depressed economy can still have a positive inflation rate – most likely 
because of downward nominal rigidities and well-anchored inflation expectations. 
A central bank that is overly focused on inflation might miss the urgency of the 
situation and not act as aggressive as necessary (Krugman, 2010). 
Finally, there is an additional reason why some countries cannot further 
stimulate a depressed economy – the liquidity trap. Such an environment was 
observed in Japan in the 1990s and is currently the reality in U.S. 
IV. Modeling 
The effect of monetary policy during recessions on the ensuing recoveries is 
first analyzed on the background of countries, experiencing “ordinary” recessions. 
This is meant to serve as a benchmark. Then, the effect of monetary policy is 
analyzed in countries undergoing banking crises.  
Monetary Policy in Ordinary Recessions
The goal is to see if recovery growth rates after ordinary recessions 
are significantly affected by monetary policies.  For that purpose a fixed effects 
model is used (IMF, 2009a). The reason for this is to capture the effect of any 
unobservable country-level characteristics that pertain to the recessions and 
recoveries experienced. For example, a country with an export-oriented economy 
might be able to faster drag itself out of a recession. Such an occurrence would 
be captured by the fixed-effects model assuming that throughout the period under 
consideration the export industry has held a similar role. In particular, the model 
estimated is:
RecGrowth
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The dependent variable is the recovery growth rate one year after the 
trough of the recession.  I control for the amplitude and duration of the recession 
– these are characteristics of the business cycle itself that might differ within 
a certain country over time. For example, there is nothing to make us believe 
that external shocks which hit an economy should be of the same size. Milton 
Friedman’s “plucking model”, which has been empirically verified, suggests 
that the coefficient estimate on Amplitude, c
1, 
should be positive – the deeper 
the recession, the stronger the recovery. Furthermore, I expect that prolonged 
recessions have slower recoveries. As a result, the coefficient estimate on 
Duration, c
2, 
is conjectured to be negative. Duration is measured in quarters.
The monetary policy response over the recession period, the variable 
MP, is measured as the sum of the residuals of a monetary policy rule over each 
quarter over the recession period. I expect that countries that increased interest 
rates above what is warranted by a Taylor rule experienced slower recoveries. As 
a results, the coefficient estimate on MP, c
3 
,is conjectured to be negative.
As mentioned, monetary policy shocks are identified from the residuals 
of a monetary policy rule. For that purpose, following the methodology of the 
latest issue of the World Economic Outlook, a Taylor rule of the following form 
was estimated for each country: 
it=b0+b1*dummy_85+ b2*πt+ b3*gapt+ ut,
where i
t
 is the nominal interest rate, dummy_85 is a dummy for periods after 1985 
(to allow for a shift in equilibrium rates), π
t
 is the inflation rate and gap
t
  is a 
measure of the output gap (potential GDP is measured using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter). Using the real interest rate as the dependent variable does not change the 
results, since inflation is included in the model.
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 The fiscal policy response over the recession period, the variable CAGC, is 
cyclically adjusted government consumption. I expect that an increase in this variable 
will lead to a higher growth rate of the recovery. Therefore, c
4
should be positive. 
Again, the methodology of the World Economic Outlook is used. First, the elasticity 
of government consumption with respect to the business cycle is estimated:
lngc
t
=d
0
+d
1
*gap
t
+ d
2
*trend+ e
t
.
As above, gap
t 
is a measure of the output gap. Trend is a time trend. Second, the 
cyclically adjusted government consumption is computed as:
CAGC
t
=gc
t
(1-d
1
*gap
t
). 
 In addition to the above estimations, a check for the robustness of the results 
is performed. The duration of the recession is used as dependent variables in some of 
the estimations to see if the effects of the monetary and fiscal policies change. 
Monetary Policy in Financial Crises
The effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the duration of the 
recession and the strength of the recovery following financial crises are analyzed. 
In addition, monetary policy is examined in cases of forbearance - banks left to 
function despite being technically insolvent, and prudential regulations (such as 
for loan classification and loan loss provisioning) suspended or not fully applied. 
If forbearance has a negative effect on the effectiveness of monetary policy, then 
insufficient use and diminished effectiveness of an otherwise powerful tool for 
stimulating recoveries might be responsible for the sluggishness of some financial 
crisis episodes. Data for forbearance is available only for about thirty five countries 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2010), while the sample of all financial crises includes 
about eighty countries. Consequently, two different estimations are performed. 
The model that includes forbearance is:
RecGrowth=c
0
+c
1
*Ampl i tude+c
2
*Durat ion+c
3
*MP+c
4
*MPForb+ 
c
5
*Forbearance + c
6
*GDP(-1) + e  (2)
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The variables RecGrowth, Amplitude, and Duration are the self-
explanatory. They are measured as the recovery growth rate one year after the 
trough of the recession, the sum of GDP growth rates during the recession, and 
the duration of the recession in quarters.  
Monetary policy is measured as the change in real money market rates 
over the course of the recession. If money market rates are not available, then their 
closest substitute is used. The reason for the difference from before is the usage 
of yearly data. Estimating residuals from a Taylor rule would be too imprecise 
with yearly data. A decrease in interest rates would mean that there is a negative 
change in real money market rates. Therefore, we are testing if c
3
, the coefficient 
estimate on the monetary policy measure, is negative. Note that the dependent 
variable is the growth rate, or the output gap, in the recovery phase, which is at 
least one year after the implementation of monetary policies; this would eliminate 
any endogeneity problems. 
In addition to the measure for monetary policy, the regression equation 
includes an interaction term between the changes in real interest rates and 
forbearance. Forbearance is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not there 
is regulatory forbearance during the years [t, t+3], where t denotes the starting 
year of the crisis. This variable is based on a qualitative assessment of information 
contained in IMF Staff Reports (Laeen and Valencia). As part of this assessment, 
information is collected on whether or not banks were permitted to continue 
functioning despite being technically insolvent, and whether or not prudential 
regulations (such as for loan classification and loan loss provisioning) were 
suspended or not fully applied during the first three years of the crisis. 
The interaction term is supposed to estimate whether in cases of 
forbearance the effect of monetary policy is reduced. Previous experience has 
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suggested that this might be the case. For example, many observers consider the 
policies undertaken by Sweden in the early 1990s to have been highly effective 
in restoring the health of the financial system and paving the way for a strong 
recovery through extensive use of expansionary policies (IMF, 2009). In contrast, 
in Japan, slow recognition of the bad-loan problem contributed to a sluggish 
recovery from the financial crisis, even though interest rates were at the zero 
bound. The effectiveness of monetary policy might be disrupted if the interest 
rate and credit channels of the monetary policy transmission mechanism are not 
properly working during a banking crisis.
In other words, the coefficient estimate on MPForb is expected to be 
positive. The marginal impact of MP is given by c
3
+c
4
*Forb. We expect that c
3 
would be negative. Therefore, if forbearance diminishes the effect of monetary 
policy it should be making the whole term bigger (“less negative”). This would 
mean that we are testing whether the coefficient estimate on MPForb, c
4
, is positive. 
Finally, forbearance is also included in the model. We would expect that if 
the authorities do not address and act on failing banking institutions, then this would 
have a direct negative effect on the economy. However, it is not particularly clear 
how long lasting this deleterious impact might be. Generally, we would expect that 
recovery growth rates might be negatively affected by forbearance.  Therefore, we 
are testing to see if the coefficient estimate of Forbearance, c
5
, is negative. 
The estimated model without forbearance would look like:
RecGrowth=c
0
+c
1
*Amplitude+c
2
*Duration+c
3
*MP+c
4
*GC+c
5
*GDP(-1)+e  (3)
The definition of the variables is the same as above. The only difference 
is that the government consumption variable is added. In particular, fiscal policy 
is proxied by the percentage change in government consumption. This measure 
is used instead of the fiscal balance, because the last would cause endogeneity. A 
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change in output affects the fiscal balance (it is a fraction of output) and a change 
in the fiscal balance affects output.  An increase in government consumption 
during the recession phase is expected to positively affect recovery growth 
rates. Therefore, we are testing if c
4
, the coefficient estimate on the change in 
government consumption, is positive. 
In addition to the above estimations, a couple of robustness checks are 
performed. The duration of the recession and the output gap one year after the end 
of the recession are used as dependent variables. 
Data
In getting a better understanding of the recovery that will follow the 2008-09 
recession through the lenses of historical experience we have two choices. We can 
either draw conclusions from the financial crises that occurred during the 1930s, 
or look at the ones that have plagued the world in the past forty years. The reason 
for this is the striking pattern of occurrence of financial crises worldwide. From 
the 1940s up to the early 1970s, there were almost no banking crises in the world.1 
However, with the financial and international capital account liberalization of the 
1970s, banking crises have re-emerged (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a).
This paper focuses on the period 1970-2005 and it uses two distinct data sets. 
The first one consists of data on recessions and recoveries in a set of advanced 
countries. The countries are those identified in the Statistical Appendix of the 
2010 issue of the World Economic Outlook as advanced. Then, subject to data 
availability the monetary and fiscal policy responses during all of the recessions 
since 1970 in the selected countries are analyzed.  Quarterly data is used. To 
1 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) argue that this calm might be partly explained by booming world 
growth, but perhaps more so by the repression of the domestic financial markets (in varying de-
grees) and the heavy-handed use of capital controls followed for many years after WWII. 
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measure the stance of monetary and fiscal policies money market rates and 
government consumption are employed. The main source of the data is the 
International Financial Statistics database of the IMF. Given that only a few of the 
countries have data going back before 1977 this limits the sample. 
The procedure for identifying business cycles is an algorithm called BBQ 
(Bry and Boschan procedure for quarterly data; see Harding and Pagan, 2002). 
A MATLAB version of a program that imitates the algorithm can be found at 
www.ncer.edu.au. It uses quarterly output data to identify peaks and troughs. 
A complete cycle goes from one peak to the next peak with its two phases the 
contraction phase (from peak to trough) and the expansion phase (from trough to 
peak). The algorithm requires that the minimum duration of the complete cycle 
and each phase must be at least five and two quarters, respectively. Table1 in the 
appendix shows the recessions (peak-to-trough) identified by this algorithm.
 The second dataset consists of eighty financial crisis episodes in both 
developed and developing countries. Laeven and Valencia identify 124 systemic 
banking crises between 1970 and 2007 (2008). Data on real GDP, inflation, 
government consumption and interest rates is collected from the International 
Financial Statistics database of the IMF. Eighty of the 124 crisis episodes had 
output data available. Furthermore, of those eighty countries not all have both 
government consumption and interest rates data available. As a result, the sample 
is limited to less than eighty countries in the various regressions below. To measure 
the stance of monetary and fiscal policy money market rates and government 
consumption are used. Wherever money market rates are unavailable, their closest 
substitute is used. Data on forbearance is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
and it is limited to about 35 countries for which the authors provide information 
on various financial policies undertaken. All data is yearly.
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 Figures 1 and 2, in the appendix, describe the output dynamics and duration 
of recessions associated with financial crises. Those recessions are particularly 
severe – the amplitude of the recession is on average about four percent of real 
GDP and the mean duration is about five quarters. In addition, seventy percent 
of the crisis periods considered have a duration of one year or more. The policy 
response in those crises is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Monetary policy, proxied 
by the change in money market rates, seems to be expansionary – real interest 
rates have declined during both the first year and the whole duration of the crisis. 
However, these declines can be mainly explained by the inflationary dynamics in 
the countries and not by the explicit behavior of policy makers. Figure 3 shows 
that nominal interest rates have actually increased slightly. On the contrary, fiscal 
policy, proxied by the change in government consumption, seems to be markedly 
procyclical. Approximately one half of the crisis episodes were characterized by a 
negative change in government consumption during the duration of the recession. 
Note that government consumption data is available for 78 out of the 80 countries 
under consideration. That number for interest rates is 70.
 The start of the financial crises themselves is taken from Laeven and 
Valencia (2008). The peaks of the recessions are identified using a one-year 
window around the start of the financial crisis. In this way, it is ensured that the 
recessions under consideration are, in fact, associated with the financial crises. 
Note, however, that in some of the crisis periods there was no output loss – in 
those cases, following Cecchetti et al. (2010) the duration and the amplitude of the 
recession are set equal to zero. Table 2, in the appendix, shows the start of each of 
the banking crises under consideration (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
V. Empirical Evidence
The effects of monetary and fiscal policies during recessions on the ensuing 
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recoveries are first analyzed in the sample of advanced countries, experiencing 
“ordinary” recessions. Then, the effects of monetary and fiscal policies are 
analyzed in the sample of countries undergoing banking crises. 
Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Ordinary Recessions 
The table below shows the regression results from estimating the 
fixed effects model specified above – regressions (3) and (4). In addition to this 
model, one is estimated with a dependant variable the duration of the recession – 
regressions (1) and (2). The results of the two sets of models are largely consistent. 
The same set of variables is statistically significant in both of them. Also, the 
estimations without fixed effects in both cases have a much smaller explanatory 
power than the ones with fixed effects. 
Table 3 – Results for the severity and sluggishness of ordinary recessions.
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Duration   -.024 -.077
   (-.13) (-0.46)
Amplitude -.109 -.133 -.488*** -.130
 (-0.91) (-3.00)*** (-3.19) (-1.47)
RealRate 5.39 4.93 -4.207 -1.005
 (2.60)** (2.72)*** (-2.43)*** (-.62)
GC .134 .006 .120 .008
 (1.50) (0.22) (.373) (.18)
Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Observations 66 66 74 66
R-squared 0.41 0.30 0.40 0.04
Notes: unbalanced panel with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** 
denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors 
used. The dependent variable in (1) and (2) is the duration of the recession. The dependent 
variable in (3) and (4) is the recovery growth rate one year after the trough of the recession.
Looking at regression numbered (3) we see that the recession amplitude 
has a statistically significant effect on the growth rate in the recovery phase. The 
coefficient estimate is statistically significant in difference from zero at the 1 
percent level of significance. Note that amplitude measures the percentage decline 
in GDP during the recession phase – peak to trough. This result suggests that 
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the steeper the recession, the faster the recovery. Furthermore, as expected the 
coefficient estimate on the RealRate is also statistically significant in difference 
from zero – at the five percent level of significance. As previously noted the 
RealRate is the sum of the impulses relative to the policy rule for each quarter over 
the recession period. In other words, RealRate represents the sum of the residuals 
from an estimated monetary policy rule. This would mean that an increase in the 
RealRate corresponds to an increase in money market rates above what a policy 
rule warrants. Therefore, as expected the coefficient estimate is negative. However, 
government consumption does not significantly affect recovery growth rates. One 
reason for this occurrence might be that the estimation does not account for the 
level of government debt, something found to be important for the effectiveness 
of fiscal policy (IMF, 2009). Furthermore, as Krugman and Eggertsson (2010) 
argue, the effect of fiscal policy is the biggest when there are credit constrained 
agents in the economy – as during a financial crisis. 
The coefficient estimates agree in magnitude with those estimates in 
previous studies (IMF, 2009). In addition, the R-squared of the fixed effects 
model is pretty high, 40 percent, given that the dependent variable is growth rates 
one year after the recession has occurred. However, the R-squared of the model 
without the fixed effects is rather low – less than 4 percent of the variation of the 
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables included. 
The estimation that has the duration of the recession as the dependent 
variable (regression equation (1) also suggests that monetary policy significantly 
affects the length of the recession. 
Monetary Policy in Financial Crises 
 The table below shows the regression results from estimating the model 
for financial crises. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of 
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the recession, the recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough 
of the recession. The results of these three models are consistent with each other. 
In models (1), (2) and (3) increases in government consumption have a significant 
negative effect on the duration of the recession and a significant positive effect on 
recovery growth rates. The growth rate of GDP prior to the recession also seems 
to matter (regression equations (1) and (2)). Countries with higher prior growth 
rates tend to have stronger recoveries and shorter recessions. 
Table 2 – Results for severity and sluggishness of banking crises.
 (1) (2) (3)                           
Duration  -.058 -.003
  (-.62) (-4.82)***
Amplitude  -.066                                
  (0.33)                                
Real GDP (-1) -.428 .232 -.0003    
 (-1.77)* (1.86)* (0.86)    
RealRate 0.011 .011 -.0003                           
 (0.32) (0.50) (-.79)                      
Cum.Gov.Con. -.125 .066 .001                                                  
 (-3.74)*** (2.06)** (3.23)***                                                        
Observations 66 65 66                                 
R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.40        
                      
Notes: unbalanced panel with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** 
denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors used. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of the recession, the 
recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the recession. 
However, monetary policy does not significantly affect recovery growth 
rates, output gaps and duration of the recession. This might be due to the reduced 
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanism during times of 
financial distress (IMF, 2009). The same results hold whether real or nominal 
rates are used. Furthermore, it does not make a differenceifthe cumulative change 
in interest rates over the whole duration of the recession is used or the change in 
the first year of the crisis. There have been reversals of policy, especially in the 
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crises that involve currency upheavals like the ones in the Asian Financial crisis 
so such a check makes sense. 
 As explained before, the effectiveness of monetary policy might be 
affected by the extent to which financial reforms were implemented in the affected 
countries. To formally test this hypothesis, a smaller sample of countries is used, for 
which data on forbearance is available. Forbearance is the qualitative assessment 
of whether banks were permitted to continue functioning despite being technically 
insolvent. The regressions below try to assess the impact of forbearance. Again, 
three dependent variables are used – the duration of the recession, the recovery 
growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the recession. 
Table 3 – Results for the effect of monetary policy in the case of forbearance during 
banking crises.
 (1) (2) (3)
Duration  -.052  -.004 
  (-0.40) (-2.98)***           
Amplitude  -.018                                             
   (-0.18)                                          
Real GDP (-1) -.060 .006   -.0008
 (-0.27)    (0.964)        (-0.37) 
RealRate -.034 .004         -.0026***
 (0.59)  (0.92)         (-4.34) 
RealRate*Forb. .06                   .092   .020 
 (0.92) (1.30) (2.70)** 
Forb.                        -1.35 2.42 -.020   
                               (2.07)** (-1.16) (-0.55)                                 
Observations       30           30           30                
R-squared            .03             0.27       0.47        
Notes: t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** denote level of significance indicating 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of 
the recession, the recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the 
recession. Robust standard errors used.
The coefficient estimates in the model that has recovery growth rates as a 
dependent variable are statistically insignificant in difference from zero. However, 
in the estimation using the output gap as the dependent variable, the change in 
31
money market rates is statistically significant. An increase in money market rates 
leads to a decrease in the output gap. Furthermore, forbearance dampens the 
effect of monetary policy as indicated by the negative coefficient estimate on 
RealRate*Forb. Also, this diminishing effect seems to be quite significant as it 
is bigger in magnitude than the positive effect of monetary policy on recovery 
growth rates. The lack of explanatory power of the independent variables in the 
model with recovery growth rates as the regressand agrees with previous studies 
which find that recovery growth rates are harder to predict than output gaps (IMF, 
2009). Furthermore, we can see that the estimation with duration as the dependent 
variable also lacks statistical significance. This might be explained with the 
fact that forbearance is defined over the three years following the beginning of 
the recession. As a result, its effect might not be felt during the duration of the 
recession.  
In summary, the empirical results suggest differences between the effects of 
monetary and fiscal policies on the duration of recessions and the strength of 
recoveries in ordinary recessions and in systemic financial crises. During ordinary 
recessions expansionary monetary policy seems to be a powerful tool, generating 
significant increases in recovery growth rates. During recessions associated with 
financial crises, expansionary monetary policy still has a significant effect on the 
strength of the recovery. However, this effect is dependent on the implementation 
of prompt financial policies, and in particular, on intervention with insolvent 
financial institutions. The effectiveness of fiscal policy is reversed – it is a 
powerful tool during banking crises, but it does not seem to significantly affect 
recovery growth rates during ordinary recessions. 
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VI. Conclusions
Non-Keynesian policies in the face of a financial crisis are not a thing of 
the past. A number of advanced economies have pursued contractionary policies 
in the most recent financial crisis. This has certainly been the case in Europe. 
Many countries there embraced austerity in the face of a slumping economy – 
France, Britain and Ireland, for example. In addition, some EU members had to 
settle with insufficiently expansionary monetary policies, because of the outsized 
influence of Germany over the European Central bank and the better performance 
of the German economy. While policies in the U.S. have been more favorable 
towards sustaining a recovery, this has not come without much debate. Ideas and 
arguments supporting fiscal retrenchment have abounded. This is exemplified in 
the work of some prominent economists like that of Alesina and Ardagna (2009). 
The political climate has also been antagonistic towards some of the actions 
policy makers have tried to undertake. For example, there was a huge backlash 
against the quantitative easing program the Fed started to implement in late 2010 
– something that can have a particularly deleterious effect when the economy is 
in the midst of a liquidity trap and when the Fed’s credibility in influencing the 
public’s expectations is the main tool out (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2011). 
In this paper, I use two different samples with data from 1970 to 2005 to 
study the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the profiles of recessions and 
recoveries. In other words, I ask whether pursuing non-Keynesian policies has 
mattered during past financial crises. Several results emerged from the econometric 
analysis. First, monetary policy during ordinary recessions and banking crises is a 
powerful tool with lasting effects that extend to recovery growth rates. However, 
the effect of monetary policy during financial crises is strongly diminished in the 
case of forbearance – banks left to function despite being technically insolvent. 
Second, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is reversed – it is a powerful tool during 
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banking crises, but it does not seem to significantly affect recovery growth rates 
during ordinary recessions. Finally, the policy response during past financial crisis 
does not seem to be particularly expansionary – on the contrary, fiscal policy is 
markedly procyclical, while monetary policy is neutral. In summary, the results 
suggest it is possible that inappropriate fiscal and monetary policies and the lack 
of financial reforms could be one reason why recoveries associated with financial 
crises turn out to be particularly protracted.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) argue that both advanced and developing 
countries suffer from the “this time is different” syndrome when it comes to 
financial crises, because policy makers and the public tend to believe that they 
are immune from a crisis due to some circumstances that make them special. 2 
This paper suggests that this syndrome should be avoided when it comes to policy 
as well. This time is not different and expansionary policies should be pursued. 
Past financial crises have been so protracted in part because of the embracement 
of austerity and in part because of the lack of realization that financial crises are 
inherently more severe. 
2 An example of that line of thinking involves the securitization process of mortgage backed securi-
ties in the U.S. prior to the most recent recession. People thought that these new “synthetic” prod-
ucts have managed to practically eliminate all risk from the economy. With the benefit of hindsight, 
we know that this was not the case. 
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Figure 1: Output Dynamics in Banking Crises (growth rates) 
 
 
Figure 2: Duration of Banking Crises (in years) 
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Figure 3: Change in Interest Rates (first year of crisis and peak-to-trough) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Change in Government Consumption (first year of crisis and peak-to-trough) 
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Table 1: Recessions in Advanced Countries (peaks and troughs)
Country Peak Trough
Australia 1960 Q3 1961 Q3
Australia 1965 Q2 1966 Q1
Australia 1971 Q3 1972 Q1
Australia 1975 Q2 1976
Australia 1977 Q2 1978
Australia 1981 Q3 1983 Q2
Australia 1990 Q2 1991 Q2
Austria 1978 1979 Q1
Austria 1981 1982 Q1
Austria 1984 1985 Q1
Austria 2001 2002 Q1
Belgium 1982 1983 Q1
Belgium 1992 1993 Q1
Belgium 1998 1998 Q3
Canada 1980 Q1 1980 Q3
Canada 1981 Q2 1983
Canada 1990 Q1 1991 Q1
Denmark 1977 Q3 1978 Q1
Denmark 1980 1981 Q1
Denmark 1988 1988 Q3
Denmark 1993 1993 Q3
Denmark 1995 1995 Q3
Denmark 2002 2003 Q1
Denmark 2005 2006 Q1
France 1974 Q3 1975 Q1
France 1992 Q3 1993 Q2
Germany 1962 Q3 1963 Q1
Germany 1966 Q3 1967 Q2
Germany 1974 Q1 1975 Q2
Germany 1978 1978 Q2
Germany 1980 Q1 1982 Q3
Germany 1992 Q1 1993 Q1
Germany 1995 Q3 1996 Q1
Germany 2002 Q3 2003 Q2
Italy 1981 1981 Q3
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Italy 1982 Q1 1983
Italy 1992 Q1 1993 Q3
Italy 1996 Q1 1997
Italy 2001 Q1 2002
Italy 2003 2003 Q2
Italy 2004 Q3 2005 Q1
Japan 1974 1975 Q1
Japan 1993 Q1 1993 Q3
Japan (financial crisis) 1997 Q1 1999 Q1
Japan 2001 Q1 2002
Netherlands 1980 Q1 1981 Q3
Netherlands 1982 Q1 1983 Q1
Netherlands 2001 Q2 2002 Q1
Portugal 1978 1978 Q2
Portugal 1981 Q2 1982 Q1
Portugal 1983 1984 Q1
Portugal 1992 Q1 1993 Q1
Portugal 2002 2003 Q1
Portugal 2005 Q2 2007 Q1
Spain 1975 1975 Q2
Spain (financial crisis) 1978 Q3 1979 Q1
Spain 1981 1981 Q2
Spain 1992 Q1 1993 Q2
Switzerland 1981 Q2 1983
Switzerland 1986 Q2 1987
Switzerland 1990 Q3 1991 Q2
Switzerland 1992 Q1 1993 Q1
Switzerland 1996 Q1 1996 Q3
Switzerland 2002 Q2 2003 Q2
United Kingdom 1961 Q2 1962
United Kingdom 1973 Q2 1974 Q1
United Kingdom 1974 Q3 1975 Q3
United Kingdom 1979 Q2 1981 Q1
United Kingdom 1990 Q2 1991 Q3
USA 1969 Q3 1971
USA 1974 1975 Q1
USA 1980 Q1 1980 Q3
USA 1981 Q3 1982 Q1
USA 1990 Q2 1991 Q1
40
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Table 2: Financial Crises included in the sample (Laeven and Valencia, 2008) 
 
Country 
Start of 
Financial 
Crisis 
Argentina 2001 
Argentina 1995 
Bangladesh  1987 
Benin  1988 
Bolivia 1986 
Bolivia 1994 
Brazil  1990 
Brazi 1994 
Bulgaria 1996 
Burkina Faso 1990 
Burundi  1994 
Cameroon  1987 
Cameroon  1995 
Cape Verde   1993 
Central African Rep.  1995 
Chad  1992 
Chile 1981 
Chile  1976 
China, P.R.  1998 
Colombia 1998 
Colombia  1982 
Congo, Republic of  1992 
Costa Rica  1987 
Costa Rica  1994 
Croatia 1998 
Czech Republic 1996 
Dominican Republic 2003 
Ecuador 1998 
Ecuador  1982 
Finland 1991 
Ghana  1982 
Guinea-Bissau  1995 
Guyana  1993 
Hungary 1991 
India  1993 
Indonesia 1997 
Jamaica 1996 
Japan 1997 
Jordan  1989 
Kenya  1985 
Kenya  1992 
Korea 1997 
Kuwait  1982 
Latvia 1995 
Lithuania 1995 
Madagascar  1988 
Malaysia 1997 
Mali  1987 
Mexico 1994 
Mexico  1981 
Morocco  1980 
Mozambique  1987 
Nepal  1988 
Nicaragua 2000 
Nigeria  1991 
Norway 1991 
Panama 1988 
Paraguay 1995 
Peru  1983 
Philippines  1983 
Philippines 1997 
Poland  1992 
Russia 1998 
Senegal  1988 
Slovak Republic  1998 
Spain  1977 
Sri Lanka 1989 
Swaziland  1995 
Sweden 1991 
Thailand 1997 
Thailand  1983 
Togo  1993 
Tunisia  1991 
Turkey 2000 
Uganda  1994 
United States  1988 
Uruguay  1981 
Uruguay  2002 
Venezuela 1994 
Vietnam 1997 
Yemen 1996 
Zambia 1995 
Zimbabwe  1995 
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Local Technological and Demographic Effects on Electricity 
Transmission: A Spatially Lagged Local Estimation of 
New England Marginal Losses
Jacob Hochard
Abstract: 
 Electricity transmission is subject to distribution losses and congestion 
costs.  Economists have prior theorized that these transmission imperfections 
could create divided markets with electricity generating spatial oligopolists.  This 
concern has been largely dismissed because of recent technological advances 
in electricity transmission.  The effects of local technological and demographic 
indicators on electricity transmission costs remains both commonly accepted 
as negligible and spatially untested.  This analysis employs a spatially lagged 
local estimation of New England’s marginal electricity losses with respect to 
both technological and demographic indicators.   The results of this analysis 
are consistent with the widely accepted notion that technological advances have 
mitigated the effect of local distribution losses and local congestion costs on 
electricity prices. 
Keywords: Transmission grid losses, locational marginal prices, New England 
ISO, technological indicators.
Introduction 
Electricity markets and other networked goods like water, oil, cable television 
and railways have become an enjoyable research pastime for economists 
concerned with market structure issues.  Electricity markets are embedded with 
unique commodity specific and trade specific considerations that complicate the 
analysis of this market.  The two most important electricity specific considerations 
are (1) the physical laws that electricity must abide by and (2) the limitations of 
electricity transmission via infrastructural constraints.   
Electricity, in the form of electrons transmitted along a transmission cable, is 
subject to a certain degree of “resistance”.  This resistance is defined in the form 
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of two foundational laws of electricity (1) Ohm’s Law and (2) Kirchoff’s Law. 
Ohm’s law connects the three concepts of current, voltage and resistance.  Current 
can be defined simply as electrons moving through a transmission cable between 
two points.  Voltage is the force that allows these electrons to move between two 
points and resistance is the measurable inhibiting force between those two points 
caused by electron transit friction (Kostiner, 1994).  Kirchoff’s Law states that 
the “sum of all currents entering and exiting a node must be equal to zero”.  In 
essence, this law states that electrons will travel the path of least resistance.  These 
two laws have direct applications to electricity trade markets that must be taken 
into consideration (Kostiner, 1994).  
Under Kirchoff’s law, unlike most traditional commodities, electricity cannot 
be stored for future consumption.  The transmission grid is therefore always in a 
state of perfect production-consumption equilibrium.  Ohm’s law also states that 
with “resistance” as a function of voltage capacity (the size of the transmission 
cable) and current strength there will be inherent distribution losses of electricity. 
These distribution losses are also a function of the distance that electrons travel 
from the point of production to the point of consumption and the local weather 
(Robertazzi, 2007).  The existence of “resistance” on the transmission grid also 
makes possible transmission grid “congestion” to occur.  This congestion occurs 
when the current from point A to point B on the transmission grid reaches the 
voltage capacity of that respective transmission line.  Under Kirchoff’s law, 
however, we know that electrons will take the path of least resistance and 
congestion into and out of any particular node will be equal.  
The physical properties of electricity also have unique benefits.  In theory, 
a transmission grid without congestion (a high enough voltage and low enough 
current) can transfer electricity across long distances, instantly.  It has been 
argued, for example, that electricity produced from solar resources in Northern 
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Africa could be traded competitively in the European electricity markets with 
proper transmission voltage capacity expansions (Bauer et. al., 2008).  The 
demand schedule of electricity is predictable but inconstant.  For example, peak-
demand typically occurs during a warm day in the early evening when electricity 
consumption is high.  The transmission grid’s unique range may allow distant 
competitive suppliers of electricity to exploit far-reaching peak-demand markets 
during their off-peak hours (Shakourig et. al., 2009). 
Conventional theory recognizes price increases as a result of distribution 
losses and congestion but the impossibility of predicting where produced electricity 
will be consumed has overshadowed the potential influence of citing generation 
sources in close proximity to electricity demand centers.  Furthermore, the spatial 
analysis of these grid losses, on a local scale, may have lost its appeal because 
advances in transmission capacity are occurring rapidly and better integrating 
larger regions.  In theory, this would make local indicators less important and 
spatial demographic and technological indicators less predictable.  The purpose 
of this analysis is to estimate locational marginal price losses, resulting from 
electricity distribution losses and congestions, using local and demographic 
indicators.
Literature Review 
 Two and a half decades ago Benjamin Hobbs (1985) predicted that 
the deregulation of electricity generation would create spatial oligopolists 
resulting from network barriers.  Hobbs conducted a theoretic Nash-Bertrand 
spatial equilibrium to predict the price variation of electricity in New York’s 
regional markets.  His results showed that transport costs and significant scale 
economies would yield generator spatial oligopolists.  The spatial oligopolists 
would cause regional price increases and the ability for generators – with natural 
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barriers caused by transport costs - to exercise market power.  Over the past 
25 years, however, the scale of these economies has increased drastically.  The 
grid is interconnected extremely well and technological advances have allowed 
for less costly electricity transmission across further distances.  These changes 
may have removed the natural barriers that Hobbs envisioned in the mid-1980s. 
Additionally, Hobbs’ analysis is conducted using a theoretic price equilibrium 
calculated using mathematically linear programs to obtain local spatial price 
equilibria.  This theoretic concept deserves attention using spatial analysis.
 The Independent Electricity Market Operator (IEMO) in charge of 
operating the electricity grid in Ontario released a PowerPoint in January, 2004 
outlining historical nodal pricing analysis on their grid.  This operator references 
spatial analysis and its relevance to the impact of congestion and relative losses on 
the electricity market.  The presentation uses locational marginal prices (LMPs) 
that include a congestion and loss component1.  This analysis found that losses, 
not congestion, contributed the most to pricing variation on the local grid.  These 
system operators have perfect information and were able to determine which 
transfers incurred the highest losses.  In this case, the highest rate of congestion 
occurred along the East-West Transfer interfaces, whereas the highest losses 
from distribution occurred between the Northwest and Northeast regions of the 
grid.  No spatial analysis was considered to determine if generators’ proximity to 
demand centers influenced grid losses.  
 Ostergaard (2004) examines critically the geographic distribution of 
electricity generation in relation to grid losses in Denmark.  The Danish example 
is particularly interesting because over 40% of consumed electricity is covered by 
scattered sources as a result of large scale wind turbine investments.  Ostergaard 
1  In theory, an electricity system (in this case IEMO) will have one theoretic price across the entire 
system – any pricing deviations occur as a result of incurred congestion and distance of travel 
losses.  
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adopts basic assumptions to map the distribution of generated electricity in 
order to conduct a consumption-production spatial analysis.  In order to model 
transmission grid flows, Ostergaard uses EnergyPro GRID a complex model 
founded on an algorithm designed to predict transmission flows throughout a grid. 
His analysis concludes that it is essential for Denmark to control generation not 
only at an aggregate level but also at a local level to prevent congestion from 
occurring.  A suggestion is given to coordinate local and regional electricity 
production to ensure a fair balance without the inefficient alternative of electricity 
traveling far distances, incurring distribution costs.  
 Baban and Perry (2000) used spatial analysis to determine the optimized 
locations of new wind farm investments in England.  These clean electricity 
generators were determined based upon geographic constraints (including 
topography, land use, wind direction, wind speed, population, road access, 
hydrology and historical and cultural land marks).  The only factor that was 
considered with regard to transmission compatibility was a constraint that the 
wind farm is within 10 KM of the transmission grid.  On the demand side, the 
only consideration with regard to population was actually a 2 KM buffer on large 
settlements.  This type of consideration speaks volumes of traditional electricity 
generator citing ideologies.  The cost in distribution losses, transmission losses 
and congestion losses are not considered carefully when citing an electricity 
generator in distant proximity from its intended consumers of electricity. 
Methodology 
 I retrieved the source data for LMP nodes across New England for the 
year of 2008.  This data was created by the Independent System Operator of New 
England (ISO-NE).  I used Google Earth to locate the coordinates of each of 
these nodes and converted this coordinate data to a point data shapefile.  This 
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pricing data is in terms of $/Kilowatt Hour (KWH) and is valid for June 11th, 
2008 for electricity trade from 6:00PM – 7:00PM2.  I retrieved source data for 
electricity generators, with their respective generating capacities, present in New 
England valid for the year of 2008.  I used the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) facility registration database to locate each of these generator’s respective 
addresses.  I then used Google Earth to locate the coordinates of these addresses 
and created a point data shapefile with these coordinates (Figure 1).  United States 
(U.S.) spatial demographic data valid for the year of 2000 was retrieved from 
the U.S. census, to create demographic indicators (population and population 
density).  Finally, transmission grid spatial data, including individual line voltage 
capacities, was obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) valid for 1993.  
 I created 587 Thiessen polygons around my 813 LMP nodes (Figure 2). 
In some cases, there was more than one node located at an identical location. 
These prices were averaged because under Ohm’s and Kirchoff’s laws and the 
framework of the transmission network, electricity prices at identical locations 
are by identity, equal.  I estimated the population and population density of each 
Thiessen polygon by converting my census block-level population data to a 
raster file and then using zonal statistics to sum population.  I then calculated the 
geometry of these polygons and conducted a simple field summation to determine 
estimated population density.  I also use field calculations to estimate electricity 
generation capacity, transmission capacity/per capita, and total transmission 
length within each polygon. 
 I employed a spatially-lagged ordinary least squares (OLS) model to 
estimate the effect of these spatial and technological indicators on the nodal marginal 
2 This date and time was chosen because it was one of the warmest days recorded during the sum-
mer of 2008.  This year was also the most recent year that LMP data was available. 
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electricity losses.  In addition to the focal indicators, I included a dummy variable 
that was present (1) if my dependant variable spatial accuracy was to the street level 
and not-present (0) if the dependant variable was only accurate to the town level. 
Yi = b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6YNi + ui 
Y = Marginal Loss Component ($/KWH)
X1 = Length of grid (Miles) 
X2 = Generator Capacity (Kilowatts) 
X3 = Voltage Capacity / Per Capita (Kilovolts) 
X4 = Population Density (PP/KM
2) 
X5 = Precision Dummy Variable (1,0)
Y
N i = Spatially Lagged Neighborhood Weights of Marginal Loss 
          Component 
Lastly, a breusch-pagan test was employed to test our estimates for the presence 
of heteroskedasticic errors.  
Results 
 None of the focal explanatory variables had an estimated coefficient 
that was statistically significant in difference from zero (Table 2).  The coefficient 
estimate on the dummy variable for dependant variable precision (at the street level) 
was negative and statistically significant.  This dummy variable suggests that my 
flawed data reporting accuracy does affect my overall estimates.  This dummy 
variable coefficient is relatively intuitive as it would appear that estimated effects 
on a marginal loss price component would be less in an area that the node may not 
actually exist.  These nodal centers are likely to have higher population densities 
and transmission grid presence. Flawed accuracy may discount this estimation.  
 The spatially lagged estimated coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant.  This is expected as most of our chosen variables are inherently 
spatially-autocorrelated (Table 1).  The worst spatial autocorrelation exists within 
our dependant variable with a positive Moran’s I coefficient of 0.79 (Table 1). 
The coefficient estimates do not appear to have heteroskedastic error terms but 
despite the spatially lagged variable the coefficient estimates still suffer from 
spatial autocorrelation. 
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Conclusions
 These results do not support my null hypothesis that local technological 
and demographic indicators affect electricity’s marginal loss component at LMP 
nodes.  These results support multiple conclusions.  In a perfectly operating 
transmission network there would be no variation across our spatially lagged 
variable.  That is, the distribution losses would be constant and minimal 
across spatial units.  The estimated model only explains about three-quarters 
of the variation in our loss component.  We can conclude, therefore that there 
are technological and demographic negative influences on the New England 
transmission network causing distribution losses.  
Since we have variation in our distribution loss prices but that  variation 
cannot be explained with local indicators, we can conclude that the distribution 
losses are being incurred at locations beyond the reaching of our spatial “Thiessen 
polygon” units.  This may support that electricity is being produced in distant 
locations from where it is being consumed.  This conclusion is a success story 
for the New England transmission grid.  A distant spatial relationship between 
supply and demand of electricity supports that there is little congestion mitigating 
distant trade.  This conclusion is also supported by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) stating recently that New England is a transmission system 
with close to no transmission congestion.      
This study does suffer from many limitations.  This study does not account 
for a potential “edge effect”.  I was not able to obtain import and export data for 
New England or spatial data for the neighboring New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO).  New York City is a major demand center in close proximity 
to Connecticut.  This may be one reason why the left-hand side observations in 
this area have such a high Moran’s I coefficient (Figure 3).  Also, limited resources 
and funding have forced me to use imperfect data.  My transmission grid data was 
created by FEMA for national security impact assessment not transmission grid 
analysis.  This particular dataset is also two decades invalid.  Finally, despite using 
a spatially-lagged model, my regression estimates still suffer from the presence of 
autcorrelated errors.  I chose not to pursue this problem any further because the 
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spatially autocorrelated errors preserve unbiased but inefficiency estimates.  The 
relatively low z-scores of my estimates indicate that even with corrected errors the 
coefficients would likely remain statistically insignificant.  
Appendix
Figure 1 – Electricity structure in Suffolk County, Boston, MA including 2008 
electricity generators, 2008 locational marginal prices, 1993 transmission grid, 
and the local county boundaries. 
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Figure 2 – New England electricity marginal losses ($/KWH) for June 11th, 20008 
from 6:00PM-7:00PM.  This map includes generators and locational marginal 
price (LMP) nodes.  
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Figure 3 – Thiessen polygon-level Moran’s I values for New England Electricity 
Marginal Losses on June 11th, 2008 from 6:00 PM-7:00 PM.    
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Table 1 – Estimations from spatially-lagged ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression as well as summary statistics and tests for heteroskedastic and spatially 
autocorrelated error terms. 
Table 2 – Univariate Moran’s I coefficients for each variable. 
Hochard	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Table 1 – Estimations from spatially-lagged ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as well as 
summary statistics and tests for heteroskedastic and spatially autocorrelated error terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Univariate Moran’s I coefficients for each variable.  
Variable Moran’s I Coefficient 
Locational Marginal Prices ($/KWH)  0.7940 
Length of transmission grid (Miles)  0.3188 
Generation capacity (KWH)  -0.0029 
Capacity/Per Capita (KV/PP)  0.3729 
Population Density (PP/KM2)  0.5140 
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“Does It Pay to Be Informed?”
Expenditure Efficiency in the US Mutual Fund Industry
Jan Cerny
Introduction
The mutual fund industry would like us to believe that fund expenses 
are justifiable by their extensive management expertise, security analysis and the 
consequent delivery of returns that exceed the market performance. Management 
know-how is costly and thus it drives up the expenditure of actively managed 
mutual funds and potentially lowers their net returns.  Nevertheless the fund 
managers argue that their contributions to the returns fully outweigh their costs 
and in general their trading strategies add value to the investors. On the other 
hand many academics hold that such claims are fundamentally misleading and 
actively managed funds cannot continuously outperform a market index (See: 
Carhart 1997, Jensen 1968, Malkiel 2003, Sharpe 1964). 
This study aims to provide additional insight into the debate by examining 
the performance of US equity mutual funds over the period of 2002 – 2010. I 
carry out empirical analysis to evaluate relative performance of the funds and 
test whether managers can justify their expenses and fees by higher risk adjusted 
returns. This provides valuable implications about the validity of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) as developed by Sharpe (1964) and is beneficial to the 
broad public that engages in various fund-picking strategies. 
The preponderance of studies regarding mutual fund performance 
indicates that the topic is of crucial importance to the academics, practitioners and 
general public. Unlike most of the previous works, I do not focus on individual 
characteristics of funds that could be used for prediction of future returns. Instead, 
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I examine the performance of the mutual fund market as a whole and test the 
efficiency of resource expenditure across the industry over a period that is yet to 
be fully covered by the researchers. I explore the concept of costly information in 
financial markets and hypothesize that the market is in informational equilibrium 
where resources are spent efficiently. 
For fund expenditure to be “efficient”, it must satisfy the equilibrium 
condition that the marginal cost equals marginal benefit. Return maximization is 
the proclaimed primary goal of mutual funds and so the funds should generate new 
expenses only if such expenses are offset by resulting higher returns. Thus, in theory, 
any extra research and trading may take place only if they add value to the fund. If 
such activities that are inevitably costly do not add enough value to outweigh their 
cost, the industry does not spend their resources efficiently. Such finding would 
suggest investors should focus on funds that minimize their expenditure to the point 
where the marginal cost of their activities equal their marginal benefit. 
In addition to examining the EMH, analyzing performance of the 
funds and efficiency of their expenditure, this study provides insight into the 
controversial assumption of perfect investor rationality. Theoretically, assuming 
perfect information and rational consumers, investors would not pay high fees 
to mutual fund managers unless the managers could deliver (or create credible 
expectation of) returns that would exceed the management costs. In other words, 
if active trading did not add value, rational consumers would adjust in a long run 
and seek alternative investment strategies which would diminish the demand for 
actively trading funds.  
In the first section of this paper, I review past literature and examine its 
contributions and shortcomings. In the second section I discuss the theoretical 
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background of informational equilibrium and resource expenditure efficiency. 
Next I introduce the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and develop its 
extended version that I employ in my panel data analysis. Subsequently I discuss 
my data in the third section and present the empirical evidence in the fourth 
section. Lastly, I point out the limitations of my work and draw conclusions 
regarding my hypotheses. 
Literature Review
The ability of mutual fund managers to earn excess risk-adjusted returns1 
has been of great interest to researchers for years. Prior to the 1990s the general 
consensus of academics was that investors are not able to earn such returns and 
no fund characteristics could substantially aid them in predicting which managers 
will become the next winners or losers. Nonetheless, numerous studies after 
1990 arrived at opposite conclusions, claiming that returns on mutual funds 
and underlying securities are predictable to a certain degree. These researchers 
concluded that some types of analysis and trading activity allow for superb returns, 
which supports the case of “skilled managers” (Malkiel 1995). The literature on 
the performance of asset management strategies and mutual funds that is relevant 
to this study can be divided into three general categories:
1.) Testing the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). 
 Eugene Fama gave birth to the EMH in the 1960s claiming that, under the 
semi-strong version of the hypothesis, security prices instantly reflect all 
available public information. Consequently there is no information that the 
traders could employ to outsmart or time the market. Thus any charting or 
fundamental analysis will fail to generate substantial risk-adjusted excess 
1 Returns in excess of the risk free rate on Treasury Bills are generally referred to as “excess 
returns” 
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returns. The weak form of the EMH holds that there are no patterns in stock 
prices and so the active management is likely going to significantly increase 
expenses while only marginally contributing to returns.  Therefore, no one 
is able to systematically benefit from the inefficiencies of the market and no 
research or expertise can enhance the fund returns over several years. 
  Ever since its creation, EMH has been tested by hundreds of empirical 
studies that aimed to determine the extent to which markets are efficient. 
The early tests focused on charting and technical analysis, that are often 
associated with active trading, and found most such techniques utterly 
worthless in predicting future price movements (Karz 2010). However, the 
professionals practicing these arguably futile methods have not been driven 
out of the market and so, under the assumption of consumer rationality, their 
service must be considered valuable. In reality most financial institutions 
continue to spend billions to support their technical analysis departments. 
  Academics have also identified several anomalies and patterns that would 
allow active traders to capture substantial risk-adjusted excess returns, such as the 
“size effect” or the “January effect”. Nevertheless, many studies concluded that 
once such patterns are documented and made public, the investors exploit these 
new opportunities to the extent that the patterns disappear or become unprofitable. 
The academic research also points out the paradox of EMH. This paradox states 
that, if all investors believed that markets were efficient, no one would spend 
resources on thorough asset analysis, and so the market would effectively become 
inefficient. Thus, the fund managers who do not believe in market efficiency 
and carry out asset research in pursuit of outperforming the benchmarks play a 
crucial role in actually making the market efficient. Overall, academic research 
and back-testing provided a relatively strong support for the validity of EMH 
across different periods and diverse markets. Therefore, high expenses generated 
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by active management research are not likely to be sufficiently offset by their 
higher returns.
2.) Existence of manager stock picking or market timing skills. 
 Many researchers designed empirical studies to test the existence of skill or 
talent of portfolio managers that would enable the funds to pick the winning 
stock or to properly time their market entry and exit points. Generally, the 
scholarly literature refutes the concept of superior stock picking skills as 
a determinant of fund returns (See the renowned study by Carhart 1997 
or Henriksson 1984). Nonetheless, a limited number of studies argue that 
some managers do possess exceptional skills that allow them to exceed the 
market returns with some level of persistence (See: Gray and Kern 2010). 
Hendricks and Zeckhauser (1991), for example, examined the period of 
1975-88 and found that extensive research and active management strategy 
of mutual funds could yield an excess return of 3% to 4% every year net of 
expenses. If such skills did exist my analysis should indicate that at least 
some funds were able to significantly outperform the market after expenses. 
3.) Persistence in mutual fund performance. 
 A large body of literature focuses on the persistence in mutual fund 
performance claiming that, if there were outstanding actively trading mutual 
fund managers, it would be likely that their excess returns would display 
some level of continuity. Said differently, good players would be expected 
to win more often than others. Nonetheless, past research does not support 
the existence of long term persistence in mutual fund returns and the higher 
the expenses the shorter the persistence in positive returns usually is. For 
example Carhart (1997) documented that, even though some evidence for 
short term persistence of returns can be found, future performance of mutual 
funds is almost impossible to predict. 
59
In addition to this wealth of academic literature, thousands of investment 
practitioner articles discuss approaches that should allow investors to select the 
best mutual funds based on their history or characteristics. This literature often 
holds turnover and expense ratios to be substantial determinants of fund returns. 
Some suggest that low turnover (buy-and-hold strategy) and low expenses are 
desirable while others believe that high turnover (active trading) may be an 
indicator of sound strategy and that higher transaction costs of frequent trading 
are fully offset by increased returns. This segment of the literature fails to reach 
a consensus regarding the role of expenses in determination of returns and often 
suffers from severe methodological problems such as omission of survivorship 
bias, which leads to false sense of return predictability (Peterson et al. 2002) 
Methodology
 This study builds on the theories developed by Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) and Ippolito (1989) who introduce the concept of costly information into 
the debate over the validity of EMH. Grossman and Stiglitz assert that EMH can-
not hold since prices cannot reflect all available information, because if they did, 
traders who spent resources on obtaining such information would not receive any 
compensation (1980). I apply this framework on the equity mutual fund market 
and focus on the role of expenditure that is associated with the acquisition of in-
formation.  Most of the “active trading” strategies rely on the premise of special 
skill or information of the managers. These strategies are bound to be very costly 
as they are characterized by notably high turnover, which increases transaction 
costs, and higher management fees, resulting from employment of larger amounts 
of human capital (Sharpe 1991, Carhart 1997). It follows, that for these strategies 
to be successful, their benefit needs to outweigh their cost. Conversely, passive 
management strategies such as indexing could be classified as a buy-and-hold 
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strategy with a predictably low portfolio turnover and low expenses. Thus observ-
ing a negative relationship between expenses (indicating information acquisition) 
and the excess returns would suggest that active management at its high levels 
does not add value to investors and passive investment strategies should be pur-
sued.
 Recognizing the existence of these dissimilar management styles, I make 
the simplification that the market can be divided into two types of traders: the 
“informed” and the “uninformed” ones. The “informed” managers believe in 
existence of some information or skill that can increase their performance even 
net of expenses. On the other hand, the “uninformed” managers believe that there 
is no such information that would be worth looking for. Said differently, these 
traders hold that active management with its extensive research creates more 
expenses than it can offset by potentially higher returns. Thus the “uninformed” 
traders generally follow a market index and focus on minimizing their expenses. 
In this work I utilize the information equilibrium theory to address the 
claims of both types of traders. It is clear that acquisition of information and skills 
requires expenditure of time and other resources. Thus one would not engage 
in activity such as market research without expectations of appropriate rewards. 
Rational agents are on average able to learn from their experience. Therefore if 
the agents did not receive any rewards for their expenditure, they would no longer 
pursue the path that proved fruitless. Given these assumptions, in equilibrium, the 
marginal return to additional research or information will equal its marginal cost. 
In such equilibrium, all incentives to get more or less informed diminish.
Applying this framework to the EMH, it seems plausible that managers 
are able to outperform the market before expenses. Nevertheless, the risk-
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adjusted excess returns disappear after the as the expenses are subtracted from 
the higher returns. If the managers that focus on costly research and trading 
were able to outperform the market net of expenses on continuous basis the 
relationship between their expenses and returns would be positive. Conversely, 
if the traditional form of EMH holds, trading on special skill or information is 
essentially a losing game as such practice can only increase expenses without 
enhancing the returns, which reflects a negative relationship between expenses 
and fund performance. Lastly, if the market is in informational equilibrium, there 
will be no relationship between expenses and returns net of fees as any excess 
returns created by extensive research will be exactly offset by higher cost. 
In this work I test this relationship over a broad sample of 500 mutual 
funds. First, I employ the renowned Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as 
developed by Sharpe (1964) to analyze the actual performance of the funds. I 
estimate the following time series regression model for each fund in the dataset:
(1) R
jt
 – Rft = α + β (Rmt – Rft) + µ
Where R
jt 
is a return on a mutual fund net of fees in period t, Rft is a 
risk free interest rate at year t and Rmt is a return on a broad market portfolio 
such as the S&P 500. This model is widely accepted in the financial industry and 
allows me evaluate the relative risk-adjusted performance of the mutual funds. 
According to Sharpe (1964), the return on a security or a fund less the risk free 
rate is directly proportionate to the amount of risk that the fund takes on. This 
relies on the observation that investors need to be rewarded for taking on extra 
risk. Such reward is known as the CAPM risk premium. Thus risk, measured 
by the coefficient β, is the major determinant of returns. In general, β represents 
the sensitivity of expected excess returns on a fund or an asset j to the expected 
market returns, which is expressed by the following relationship:
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The unexplained portion of the regression, reflected in the intercept α, 
is then attributed to management skill and expertise. Positive alphas indicate that 
a fund was able to outperform the market on risk adjusted basis. Nevertheless, 
the EMH clearly suggests that the expected value of alpha is zero because, on 
average, funds cannot outperform the market as there is no information or practice 
that would enable them to continuously do so. 
If active management and research do not add value, funds engaging in 
such practices will systematically underperform the index funds and will likely 
display significantly negative alphas as a result of high expenditures.  However, 
in informational equilibrium, both actively managed and index funds will perform 
comparably, resulting in alphas that are mostly indistinguishable from zero. 
Furthermore, the average coefficient of β across the funds should be equal to unity 
as a random broad sample of widely diversified funds should in essence mimic the 
market, possessing on average as much risk as the market itself. 
Thus I hypothesize the following:
H1: E(α) = 0  
H2: E(β) = 1
In the second part of the paper I use the respective alpha and beta 
estimates from (1) to examine the role of expenses and turnover in determination 
of fund returns. Inspired by Jensen and Ippolito, I expand the CAPM model by 
including the turnover and expense ratios of funds as well as the variable BMktRF 
(=β
j
*(Rmt – Rft) ), which is a multiple of estimated beta of a fund and the market 
return in excess of the risk free rate2. I construct a pooled dataset of the sample and 
estimate the following OLS panel regression model:
(2) R
jt
 – Rft = b βj*(Rmt – Rft) +  τ turnoverjt + e expensejt + yYear + f Fund + µ
2  For detailed discussion, see the data section. 
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Where Year and Fund are dummy variables unique to each fund and 
time period. These variables address the problem of correlation of the residuals. 
The coefficient β
j 
estimated in regression (1), becomes a part of an explanatory 
variable3. The way β
j 
is estimated in (1) results in the fact that the coefficient b on 
the variable β
j
*(Rmt – Rft) should be statistically insignificant in difference from 
unity and so this coefficient is not key for the inference about my hypotheses. 
On the other hand the variables turnover and expenses play an essential 
role as they can explain some of the fund performance that was previously captured 
by alphas. I hypothesize that funds generally spend their resources efficiently. 
Therefore the coefficient on expenses should be statistically insignificant in 
difference from zero, supporting the irrelevance of expenses hypothesis. A 
positive coefficient would suggest that managers are not only able to offset the 
higher expenses created by research and trading, but that the extra returns of such 
strategy outweigh the extra costs. 
Thus, unlike most studies that simply assume a negative relationship 
between expenses and returns net of expenses, I test the relationship and 
hypothesize a neutral impact of expenses on returns:
H3: e = 0 
Lastly, to understand the connection between equations (1) and (2), 
one should take into account that the first model simply states that returns 
are determined by the movement of the market and an unexplained cluster of 
management skill and information. The second regression is then used to analyze 
this cluster and examine whether some of this unexplained portion of returns is 
attributable to expenses or fund turnover. 
3  Usage of an estimated coefficient as a part of an explanatory variable inevitably injects extra 
variation in the regression.
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Data
 In my research if would be optimal to work with monthly Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data that are used in most of the academic 
studies.  However, my data selection is restricted by the research budget as the 
financial data of the mutual fund industry are generally very costly. I limited the 
range of my data to eight annual observations in years 2002-2010 for a universe of 
small-cap growth, large-cap growth, small-cap value and large-cap value equity 
mutual funds, as supplied by Lipper – the Thompson Reuters Company. Ideally 
all observation would be included for all time periods to make my panel data 
balanced. Nevertheless, as I point out in the limitations section, this is not the case 
and my dataset misses about 7% of its observations.  
 To construct a sample from this universe of 2191 funds I randomly select 
500 mutual funds and categorize them according to their asset classes. The basic 
version of my dataset includes:  fund returns net of expenses, turnover and expense 
ratios. Furthermore I add the excess return on the market (Rmt– Rft) denoted as 
MktRf. This variable was obtained from online “French and Fama Library” and is 
constructed as follows (Kenneth R. French - Data Library):
 The excess return on the market is computed by subtracting the Treasury 
bill rate (obtained from Ibbotson Associates) from the value-weighted return on 
all stocks traded in the United States (obtained from CRSP). This variable is likely 
to move closely with the excess returns of any particular mutual fund and so I 
expect it to hold a significant explanatory power.
 Furthermore, to answer my research question I construct the dependent 
variable for excess returns of the funds (exreturn) by subtracting the risk free 
interest rate on ten-year Treasury bills from the percentage return on the fund net 
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of fees. This provides me with a measure of returns in excess of the risk free rate 
that the fund was able to capture. 
 Lastly, it appears that the random sample is fairly representative of the 
market during the period. The distribution of the sample funds across categories is 
depicted in Table 1, and Table 2 summarizes my data. For detailed data summary 
see Appendix 1.
 Table 2 correctly points out that my panel is not balanced as the variables 
exreturn, turnover and expense are missing 299, 342 and 387 observations 
respectively. Although some observations are absent, the dataset does not suffer 
from substantial survivorship bias4 as the vast majority of the sample funds survived 
throughout the examined period. In fact the mean number of periods observed per 
fund is 7.402 with minimum of 3 and maximum of 8 periods available per funds. 
Most of the unobserved periods seem to be a result of the simple fact that the fund 
were not yet in existence in the earlier years of the examined period. I further 
4 Survivorship Bias refers to a tendency to omit failed mutual funds from performance evaluation. 
If only funds that were successful enough to survive were included in the sample, the perfor-
mance results could be skewed upwards as the sample would not reflect the inferior returns of 
funds that have gone out of business. 
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(obtained	  from	  Ibbotson	  Associates)	  from	  the	  value-­‐weighted	  return	  on	  all	  stocks	  traded	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  (obtained	  from	  CRSP).	  This	  variable	  is	  likely	  to	  move	  closely	  with	  the	  excess	  
returns	  of	  any	  particular	  mutual	  fund	  and	  so	  I	  expect	  it	  to	  hold	  a	  significant	  explanatory	  power.	  
	   Furthermore,	  to	  answer	  my	  research	  question	  I	  construct	  the	  dependent	  variable	  for	  
excess	  returns	  of	  the	  funds	  (exreturn)	  by	  subtracting	  the	  risk	  free	  interest	  rate	  on	  ten-­‐year	  
Treasury	  bills	  from	  the	  percentage	  return	  on	  the	  fund	  net	  of	  fees.	  This	  provides	  me	  with	  a	  
measure	  of	  returns	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  risk	  free	  rate	  that	  the	  fund	  was	  able	  to	  capture.	  	  
	   Lastly,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  random	  sa ple	  is	  fai ly	  repres ntative	  of	  the	  market	  during	  the	  
period.	  The	  distribution	  of	  the	  sample	  funds	  across	  categories	  is	  depicted	  in	  Table	  1,	  and	  Table	  
2	  summarizes	  my	  data.	  For	  detailed	  data	  summary	  see	  Appendix	  1.	  
	  
Table	  1	  
Category	  Frequency	  in	  Percentages	  
	  
Growth	   Value	  
Large	  Cap	   41%	   21%	  
Small	  Cap	   25%	   12%	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Table	  2	  
Summary	  of	  Data	  
Variable	   #	  Observations	   Mean	   St.	  dev	   Minimum	   Maximum	  
Exreturn	   3701	   3.44	   25.9	   -­‐60.40	   164.26	  
MktRf	   4000	   3.93	   23.18	   -­‐39.94	   32.12	  
Turnover	   3658	   90.82	   97.99	   1	   1359	  
Expense	   3613	   1.46	   .64	   .07	   12.42	  
	  
	   Table	  2	  correctly	  points	  out	  that	  my	  panel	  is	  not	  balanced	  as	  the	  variables	  exreturn,	  
turnover	  and	  expense	  are	  missing	  299,	  342	  and	  387	  observations	  respectively.	  Although	  some	  
observations	  are	  absent,	  the	  dataset	  does	  not	  suffer	  from	  substantial	  survivorship	  bias4	  as	  the	  
vast	  majority	  of	  the	  sample	  funds	  survived	  throughout	  the	  examined	  period.	  In	  fact	  the	  mean	  
number	  of	  periods	  observed	  per	  fund	  is	  7.402	  with	  minimum	  of	  3	  and	  maximum	  of	  8	  periods	  
available	  per	  funds.	  Most	  of	  the	  unobserved	  periods	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  
the	  fund	  were	  not	  yet	  in	  existence	  in	  the	  earlier	  years	  of	  the	  examined	  period.	  I	  further	  examine	  
this	  potential	  problem	  of	  “creation	  bias”	  in	  the	  limitations	  section	  of	  this	  work.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Survivorship	  Bias	  refers	  to	  a	  tendency	  to	  omit	  failed	  mutual	  funds	  from	  performance	  evaluation.	  If	  only	  funds	  that	  
were	  successful	  enough	  to	  survive	  were	  included	  in	  the	  sample,	  the	  performance	  results	  could	  be	  skewed	  upwards	  
as	  the	  sample	  would	  not	  reflect	  the	  inferior	  returns	  of	  funds	  that	  have	  gone	  out	  of	  business.	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examine this potential problem of “creation bias” in the limitations section of this 
work.
Additionally, several 
other important observations 
arise from Table 2. The mean 
excess return (3.44%) is 
surprisingly high over a period 
of several economic slumps. 
Average turnover of a fund is 
90.8%, suggesting that an average fund in the sample turned over about 91% of 
its holdings during a year. Turnover rate is calculated by dividing the fund’s total 
sales or purchases (whichever is less) by its average monthly assets. The rate then 
represents the percentage of the fund holdings that change over the course of the 
year. Taking this knowledge into account I notice an outlier in the turnover data: 
1359. It seems unlikely that a fund would turn all its assets over more than 13 
times in a year. In fact, Figure 1 illustrates that only a negligible percentage of the 
turnover observations are greater than 600. Since the large outlier might impact 
coefficient estimation I drop the outliers beyond five standard deviations from the 
mean (turnover of 580). This seems theoretically justifiable as it is improbable 
that even very active funds would turn their assets over more than six times a year 
(Wermers 2002). By omitting the potential outliers I drop 23 observations5, but 
the estimates of the model change only very marginally.
 To account for the unique characteristics of each fund and each year I 
construct dummy variables that also enable me to address the problem of 
correlation between residuals. It is reasonable to assume that the funds are unique 
as different fund managers arguably possess different skills and employ dissimilar 
5  Only 0.63% of turnover data is omitted under this restriction. 
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investment strategies. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that fund managers did 
not change during the examined period or that if a manager left, the fund carried 
on the investment strategy, style and know-how of the original manager. This also 
implies that the targeted level of risk of the fund, reflected by the fund’s Beta, has 
not changed during the period, which is an essential assumption of the CAPM 
analysis. Using the methodology of Ippolito I test this assumption against my data 
by running a regression for each fund with a dummy variable D and its interaction 
term with the MktRf variable.  The regression equation takes on the following 
form: 
(3) R
jt
 – Rft = α + β (Rmt – Rft) + c D + d (Rmt – Rft)*D + µ
where D is a dummy variable for years 2006-2009. If the coefficient d were 
statistically significant in difference from zero, the assumption of constant beta 
would be highly questionable. I find that 82 funds or about 16% of my sample 
display betas that are not stable at the 95% confidence interval. Exclusion of these 
funds from my analysis however does not change the results substantially. 
Limitations 
 This study faces several key limitations that need to be addressed. First, 
due to the nature of my data, I am unable to separate trading costs and management 
expenses that are both reflected in the total expenses. Such division would enable 
me to make a stronger argument about the impact of management fees on the risk-
adjusted returns. Nonetheless, the correlation6 between expenses and turnover, 
which is directly related to trading costs, is relatively low. Therefore most of the 
expenses seem attributable to management fees. Consequently my results are 
mostly indicative of the role of management expenditure in determination of 
returns.
6  The correlation coefficient is  0.17 
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 Second, my research faces the “black box” problem for I am unable 
to ascertain changes in portfolio holdings or drifts in the beta of the funds. In 
particular, I assume that targeted level of risk (beta) and core investment strategy of 
the fund remained constant during the period. These assumptions are theoretically 
sound as most funds position themselves as pursuing a certain investment style 
and strive to retain this image in the eyes of investors. However, if this were not 
the case, my estimates of the panel data regression would not accurately reflect the 
true relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables.
 Third, my panel dataset is not balanced and suffers from a survivorship 
bias. In fact, because of the constrained data selection process I can examine only 
those funds that were still operating in 2011. Thus no funds in my dataset cease 
their existence during the analyzed period and 114 funds were not yet in business 
at the beginning of 2002. As Figure 2 indicates the number of funds in the market 
declined by approximately 6% over the period 2002-2009, while the number of 
operating funds in my sample actually increased by 28%. This “creation bias” 
may skew my results.  Nevertheless, it seems to have a relatively minor impact 
on my estimates and so it does not substantially threaten the credibility of my 
conclusions. In addition, it is interesting to note that the net asset value (NAV) of 
the mutual fund industry had been increasing at an unprecedented rate until the 
financial crisis in 2008.
 Fourth, this study can be subject to the criticism that the very limited 
number of time series observations used for estimation of alphas and betas may 
cause such estimates to be seriously inaccurate. Although a greater number of 
observations in the regression analysis would certainly be very beneficial, the 
utilized dataset should provide a good general sense of the size of the true 
coefficients. Future research should employ quarterly observations for the given 
period to produce more accurate estimates of the alphas and betas. 
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 Lastly, my analysis faces several econometric problems. Researchers 
have abundantly documented that using pooled data of this kind is likely to result 
in positive correlation among residuals. The often complex correlation between 
the residuals across time and across the industry would have a diminishing impact 
on the size of the standard errors of the estimates and could occur trough two 
avenues: The error terms may be correlated for a group of funds during a given 
year (due to the value and small stock effects etc.) or may be serially correlated for 
a specific fund (high performers may have generally positive residuals) (Ippolito 
1989). I address this issue by including dummy variables for years and funds as 
well as using HAC standard errors.
 
Results
 First, let us focus on the relative performance of funds across the time 
period to understand the patterns in their returns. Table 3 provides an overview 
of the coefficients alpha and beta estimated for each fund using the CAPM model 
(1). As I expected, the mean beta is close to the beta of market which is a unity. 
This finding supports my hypothesis H2 that on average the widely diversified 
funds hold as much risk as the market itself does (H2: E(β) = 1).
 Furthermore, the average alpha of the sample is negative, suggesting 
that the funds on average slightly underperformed the market on risk adjusted 
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basis. Nonetheless, a more useful approach to evaluate the validity of this claim 
is to test whether the individual alphas of the particular funds are lower than zero. 
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4. This table also includes a 
comparison with the results of Ippolito (1989) and Jensen (1964) who employed 
a similar methodology in their prominent studies.
 Table 4 clearly indicates that the vast majority, 97% of the sample, 
neither outperformed nor underperformed the market at a 95% confidence 
interval. This observation supports my hypothesis H1 that on average mutual 
funds neither outperform nor underperform the market after expenses (H1: E(α) 
= 0). It is worth noting that two percent of the sample funds underperformed the 
market significantly while one percent of the funds substantially outperformed the 
benchmarks. These findings are generally in accord with the results of Ippolito 
and Jensen, although their proportions of the samples that displayed alphas 
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Results	  
	   First,	  let	  us	  focus	  on	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  funds	  across	  the	  time	  period	  to	  
understand	  the	  patterns	  in	  their	  returns.	  Table	  3	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  coefficients	  alpha	  
and	  beta	  estimated	  for	  each	  fund	  using	  the	  CAPM	  model	  (1).	  As	  I	  expected,	  the	  mean	  beta	  is	  
close	  to	  the	  beta	  of	  market	  which	  is	  a	  unity.	  This	  finding	  supports	  my	  hypothesis	  H2	  that	  on	  
average	  the	  widely	  diversified	  funds	  hold	  as	  much	  risk	  as	  the	  market	  itself	  does	  (H2:	  E(β)	  =	  1).	  
	   Furthermore,	  the	  average	  alpha	  of	  the	  sample	  is	  negative,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  funds	  
on	  average	  slightly	  underperformed	  the	  market	  on	  risk	  adjusted	  basis.	  Nonetheless,	  a	  more	  
useful	  approach	   o	   valuate	  the	  validity	  of	  this	  cl im	  is	  to	  test	  wh ther	  the	  individual	  alphas	  of	  
the	  particular	  funds	  a e	  lower	  than	  zero.	  	  T e	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  4.	  
This	  table	  also	  includes	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  results	  of	  Ippolito	  (1989)	  and	  Jensen	  (1964)	  who	  
employed	  a	  similar	  methodology	  in	  their	  prominent	  studies.	  
	  
Table3	  
Overview	  for	  the	  Sample	  
	  	   Obs	   Mean	  	   St.	  Dev.	   Min	  	   Max	  
Alpha	   500	   -­‐0.62	   2.56	   -­‐11.47	   8.51	  
Beta	  	   500	   1.05	   0.18	   0.49	   1.71	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
	   	  
21	  
Table4	  
Analysis	  of	  Estimated	  Alphas:*	  
	  
	  	   Zero	   Negative	   Positive	   Total	  
Mean	  
Alpha	  
Mean	  
Beta	  
My	  results	  (2002-­‐09)	   485	   10	   5	   500	   -­‐0.62	   1.05	  
Ippolito	  (1965-­‐84)	   127	   4	   12	   143	   0.81	   0.88	  
Jensen	  (1945-­‐1964)	   98	   14	   3	   115	   -­‐1.1	   0.84	  
	   	   	   	  
*calculated	  at	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  	  
	  
Proportions	  of	  Samples:	  
	  
	  
Zero	   Negative	   Positive	  
My	  results	  (2002-­‐09)	   97%	   2%	   1%	  
Ippolito	  (1965-­‐84)	   89%	   3%	   8%	  
Jensen	  (1945-­‐1964)	   85%	   12%	   3%	  
	  
	   Table	  4	  clearly	  indicates	  that	  the	  vast	  majority,	  97%	  of	  the	  sample,	  neither	  
outperformed	  nor	  underperformed	  the	  market	  at	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval.	  This	  observation	  
supports	  my	  hypothesis	  H1	  that	  on	  average	  mutual	  fund 	  neither	  outperform	  nor	  
erp rform	  the	  market	  after	  expenses	  (H1:	  E(α)	  =	  0).	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  two	  percent	  of	  
the	  sample	  funds	  underperformed	  the	  market	  significantly	  while	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  funds	  
substantially	  outperformed	  the	  benchmarks.	  These	  findings	  are	  generally	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  
results	  of	  Ippolito	  and	  Jensen,	  although	  their	  proportions	  of	  the	  samples	  that	  displayed	  alphas	  
indistinguishable	  from	  zero	  are	  smaller.	  This	  fact	  may	  be	  attributable	  to	  numerous	  factors	  
ranging	  from	  very	  dissimilar	  market	  and	  economic	  conditions	  involving	  financial	  uncertainty	  to	  
shortcomings	  of	  my	  data.	  	  
	   Additionally,	  I	  estimate	  the	  mean	  alphas	  and	  turnover	  ratios	  by	  different	  fund	  
categories	  to	  examine	  potential	  patterns	  in	  the	  industry.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  estimation	  are	  
reported	  in	  table	  5.	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indistinguishable from zero are smaller. This fact may be attributable to numerous 
factors ranging from very dissimilar market and economic conditions involving 
financial uncertainty to shortcomings of my data. 
 Additionally, I estimate the mean alphas and turnover ratios by 
different fund categories to examine potential patterns in the industry. The results 
of this estimation are reported in table 5. 
 The table provides several appealing observations.  The largest 
negative alphas on average were documented in the large cap growth category 
while small cap value category displayed on average the greatest positive alphas. 
Since most of the security research and information is readily available in the 
large cap growth category, it is reasonable to assume that the marginal return on 
research and information is the lowest in the category. This would be especially 
true if mutual fund managers who actually carry out the research would be slower 
to act on certain information than public traders. Conversely, information is 
generally scarce among small cap stocks and particularly in the small cap value 
category. Therefore marginal return to research could be the highest in this stock 
class, enabling mutual fund managers to truly benefit from their security analysis 
and trading expertise. 
 Such hypotheses are generally supported by my findings. The large 
mean alpha in small cap value category indicates that the fund managers in this 
equity class were able to beat the “uninformed” market after expenses. Generally 
one can notice that the mean alphas, as indicators of management skill, are on 
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Table	  5	  
Mean	  Estimated	  Alphas	  by	  Categories:	  
	  
Mean	  Turnover	  by	  Categories:	  
	  	   Growth	   Value	  
	  
	  	   Growth	   Value	  
Large	  Cap	   -­‐1.25	   -­‐1.01	  
	  
Large	  Cap	   94.04	   58.26	  
Small	  Cap	   -­‐0.15	   1.27	  
	  
Small	  Cap	   122.23	   71.92	  
	  
	   The	  table	  provides	  several	  appealing	  observations.	  	  The	  largest	  negative	  alphas	  on	  
average	  were	  documented	  in	  the	  large	  cap	  growth	  category	  while	  small	  cap	  value	  category	  
displayed	  on	  average	  the	  greatest	  positive	  alphas.	  	  Since	  most	  of	  the	  security	  research	  and	  
infor ation	  is	  readily	  availabl 	  in	  the	  large	  cap	  g owth	  category,	  it	  is	  reason l 	  to	  assume	  that	  
the	  mar inal	  return	  on	  research	  and	  informati n	  i 	  the	  lowes 	  in	  the	  category.	  This	  w uld	  be	  
especially	  true	  if	   utual	  fund	  managers	  who	  actually	  carry	  out	  the	  research	  would	  be	  slower	  to	  
act	  on	  certain	  information	  than	  public	  traders.	  Conversely,	  information	  is	  generally	  scarce	  
among	  small	  cap	  stocks	  and	  particularly	  in	  the	  small	  cap	  value	  category.	  Therefore	  marginal	  
return	  to	  research	  could	  be	  the	  highest	  in	  this	  stock	  class,	  enabling	  mutual	  fund	  managers	  to	  
truly	  benefit	  from	  their	  security	  analysis	  and	  trading	  expertise.	  	  
	   Such	  hypotheses	  are	  generally	  supported	  by	  my	  findings.	  The	  large	  mean	  alpha	  in	  
small	  cap	  value	  category	  indicates	  that	  the	  fund	  managers	  in	  this	  equity	  class	  were	  able	  to	  beat	  
the	  “uninformed”	  market	  after	  expenses.	  Generally	  one	  can	  notice	  that	  the	  mean	  alphas,	  as	  
indicators	  of	  management	  skill,	  are	  on	  average	  lower	  in	  the	  large	  cap	  segments	  than	  in	  the	  
small	  cap	  categories.	  This	  observation	  might	  be	  partially	  caused	  by	  so	  called	  “size	  effect”	  which	  
states	  that	  small	  cap	  stocks	  generally	  outperform	  large	  cap	  stocks.	  This	  anomaly	  to	  the	  CAPM	  
model	  has	  been	  widely	  documented.	  French	  and	  Fama	  for	  instance	  argue	  that	  on	  average	  
holding	  small	  stock	  enables	  an	  investor	  to	  capture	  greater	  excess	  returns	  than	  holding	  other	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average lower in the large cap segments than in the small cap categories. This 
observation might be partially caused by so called “size effect” which states that 
small cap stocks generally outperform large cap stocks. This anomaly to the CAPM 
model has been widely documented. French and Fama for instance argue that on 
average holding small stock enables an investor to capture greater excess returns 
than holding other asset classes for any given level of risk (1992).  The size effect 
represents a premium that is not associated with management skills. Therefore, 
the alphas of funds focused on small cap stocks may be overstated. To test this 
claim I estimate the CAPM model (1) with SMB as an explanatory variable. The 
variable SMB is constant for every year and reflects by how much the small cap 
market portfolios, constructed by French and Fama, outperformed the large cap 
market portfolios (Kenneth R. French - Data Library). Under such estimation the 
disparity among the alphas largely disappears and the alphas become generally 
more negative, except for the category large cap growth, where the mean alpha 
slightly increases. The results of this estimation are presented in Appendix 3. 
 Turnover correctly reflects the phenomenon that value investors tend to 
wait more and trade less than growth investors. The growth investors believe that 
they can frequently trade on certain information even if it is not fully supported 
by the fundamentals of the stock (Strong 2004). For these reasons the turnover 
of growth funds is generally higher than turnover of value funds. Additionally, I 
would expect the mean turnover on the large cap growth category to be the highest 
because abundant information that one can trade on is available and because most 
day trading strategies focus on this asset class. Nevertheless, this is not the case 
and small cap value segment actually displays the highest mean turnover. This 
seemingly puzzling fact is not extremely surprising as even the most prominent 
researchers fail to reach a consensus regarding the relationship between returns, 
asset classes and fund turnover.
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 Considering these observations about the actual performance of the 
funds over the examined period I further analyze the role that expenses and 
turnover play in determination of these returns. I estimate the panel data regression 
(2) for each of the fund classes large cap growth (LG), large cap value (LV), small 
cap growth (SG) and small cap value (SV) as well as for the entire sample. In the 
estimation for particular fund classes I omit the fund and year dummy variables as 
most of the dummy variables would be dropped due to collinearly. Nevertheless, 
for the overall sample I run regressions both with (Overall 1) and without (Overall 
2) the dummy variables. Additionally, I employ HAC standard errors in all my 
estimations because my sample suffers from severe heteroscedasticity. The results 
are presented in Table 6.
 Several important observations arise from the results. The coefficient 
on BMktRf, which represents the CAPM market premium (Rmt – Rft) multiplied 
by the previously estimated beta of the fund, is not statistically significant in 
difference from one. This is exactly what I expected because beta is originally 
estimated as a coefficient on MktRf. Thus there will likely be a one to one 
relationship between BMktRf and excess returns. 
24	  
growth	  (LG),	  large	  cap	  value	  (LV),	  small	  cap	  growth	  (SG)	  and	  small	  cap	  value	  (SV)	  as	  well	  as	  for	  
the	  entire	  sample.	  In	  the	  estimation	  for	  particular	  fund	  classes	  I	  omit	  the	  fund	  and	  year	  dummy	  
variables	  as	  most	  of	  the	  dummy	  variables	  would	  be	  dropped	  due	  to	  collinearly.	  Nevertheless,	  
for	  the	  overall	  sample	  I	  run	  regressions	  both	  with	  (Overall	  1)	  and	  without	  (Overall	  2)	  the	  
dummy	  variables.	  Additionally,	  I	  employ	  HAC	  standard	  errors	  in	  all	  my	  estimations	  because	  my	  
sample	  suffers	  from	  severe	  heteroscedasticity.	  The	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  6.	  
	  
Table	  6	  
Estimated	  Coefficients	  by	  Categories:	  
Dependent	  variable:	  Exreturn	  =	  Rjt	  –	  Rft	  
	  
	   	  
	  
	  
LG	   LV	   SG	   SV	   Overall	  1	   Overall	  2	  
BMktRf	  
1.00**	  
(0.008)	  
1.00**	  
(0.007)	  
1.00**	  
(0.012)	  
1.00**	  
(0.022)	  
1.00**	  
(0.054)	  
1.00**	  
(0.006)	  
Expenses	  
-­‐1.14**	  
(0.391)	  
-­‐0.50*	  
(0.291)	  
0.74	  
(1.456)	  
0.00	  
(1.257)	  
3.89	  
(2.819)	  
0.12	  
(0.701)	  
Turnover	  
0.00	  
(0.002)	  
0.00	  
(0.002)	  
0.00	  
(0.002)	  
0.00	  
(0.005)	  
0.00	  
(0.003)	  
0.00	  
(0.001)	  
	  
**	  Statistically	  significant	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level	  
*	  Statistically	  significant	  at	  90%	  confidence	  level	  
In	  parenthesis:	  Standard	  Errors	  
	  
Overall	  1:	  Dummy	  variables	  for	  years	  and	  funds	  were	  employed	  
Overall	  2:	  No	  dummy	  variables	  were	  employed	  
	  
	   Several	  important	  observations	  arise	  from	  the	  results.	  The	  coefficient	  on	  BMktRf,	  
which	  represents	  the	  CAPM	  market	  premium	  (Rmt	  –	  Rft)	  multiplied	  by	  the	  previously	  estimated	  
beta	  of	  the	  fund,	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  in	  difference	  from	  one.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  I	  
expected	  because	  beta	  is	  originally	  estimated	  as	  a	  coefficient	  on	  MktRf.	  Thus	  there	  will	  likely	  be	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 In the regressions for the entire sample, the coefficients on expenses are 
statistically insignificant in difference from zero which supports my hypothesis 
that the impact of expenses is in essence neutral (H3: e = 0). The coefficients 
obtained from the sub-samples of asset classes are in size similar to the coefficient 
on estimation with no dummy variables. Therefore, it appears that the relatively 
high coefficient on expenses in estimation of Overall 1 is purely due to the 
inclusion of dummy variables for years and funds. 
More interestingly, the coefficient e is negative and statistically significant 
in difference from zero in the large cap categories while remaining insignificant in 
the small cap categories. This finding supports the proposed theory that the lack 
of readily available information in the small cap categories increases the marginal 
returns on information and consequently enables managers to offset their research 
and management expenses by resulting higher returns. In contrary, it seems that, 
in the large cap segment, research and active trading that drive expenses are likely 
to lower the net returns of the funds, which supports the EMH. These findings 
are not impacted by the size effect and hold among several model specifications.
Turnover seems to be almost perfectly neutral across the entire sample 
and the sub-categories because the estimated coefficients are indistinguishable 
from zero. This would imply that the amount of trading itself does not have a 
substantial impact on the returns. Additionally, turnover is a proxy for trading 
expenses that are already incorporated in the expense ratios. Therefore, as I have 
noted before, one may expect high correlation between the variables turnover 
and expenses. Nevertheless, the relatively low correlation coefficient of these 
variables (0.17) indicates that most of the expenses are due to research and 
management fees rather than trading expenses. In future, it would be beneficial to 
obtain data for management fees and expenses separately as this would strengthen 
my inference from the empirical results. 
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Conclusion
 Combining the analysis of individual fund and market performance, it 
is clear that most of the funds across different asset classes neither substantially 
outperformed nor underperformed the market on risk-adjusted basis during the 
period 2002-2009. I document that although this was true for a majority of the 
funds, some asset classes yielded greater risk adjusted excess returns than others. 
In fact, the estimation of individual fund’s alphas indicates that funds in the small 
cap categories outperformed those in the large cap segment of the market on risk 
adjusted basis. This could be caused by the fact that small stock tends to generate 
greater returns than other asset classes, for any given level of risk. This so called 
“size effect” is confirmed by my empirical analysis and artificially inflates the 
alphas of managers who focus on small cap stocks. Using the French and Fama 
methodology, I find that the differences in alphas diminish after I account for the 
size effect. This suggests that, abstracting from the size effect, the managers on 
average performed comparatively well in all of the categories. 
 Nevertheless, even after I account for the size effect, the key result 
indicated by my analysis remains unchanged: Contrary to a popular public view, 
there does not seem to be a negative relationship between expenses and returns 
net of fees.  The estimated coefficient on expenses that is indistinguishable from 
zero suggests that the mutual funds on average spend their resources efficiently. 
In other words fund expenses that generally increase due to research and active 
management are at least offset by resulting higher returns. This observation 
holds across all estimations presented in this study and is theoretically justifiable 
assuming existence of costly information in financial markets.  
 However, several interesting exceptions arise from the estimations of 
particular sub-classes. I document a significant negative impact of expenses on 
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excess returns in the large cap categories, while observing a non-negative effect 
in the small cap categories. This finding remains unaffected even after accounting 
for the size effect, suggesting its relative strength.
 Therefore, I conclude that, although the semi-strong EMH holds in most 
cases, the managers focusing on asset classes with low availability of information 
may experience high returns to information and consequently outperform the 
market before expenses. In addition, my empirical analysis indicates expenditure 
efficiency, suggesting that the overall mutual fund market as well as its small cap 
segment is in a relative informational equilibrium. In such equilibrium the traders 
carry out just enough research that its marginal cost equals marginal benefit of the 
information gained.  
 On the other hand, the large cap class of the mutual fund market does 
not appear to be in such equilibrium. I find that in this category the increased 
expenses negatively contribute to the fund returns. Therefore, in large cap, more 
research and management is unlikely to increase returns. In fact, greater active 
management is likely to be counterproductive and so I hold that the large cap 
funds are not spending their resources efficiently. To bring this market segment 
into equilibrium, rational agents would cut their expenses, decrease the amount of 
research and human capital they employ or would focus on more profitable market 
segments. It seems reasonable to believe that the reasons why this has not been the 
case lie in the problems of imperfect information and bounded rationality. Future 
research should focus on such differences between the two markets segments and 
should identify any conditions specific to the large cap funds that could reconcile 
this disparity. 
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Friedrich von Hayek: 
The Socialist-Calculation Debate, Knowledge Arguments, 
And Modern Economic Development 
Cara Elliott
Introduction
At the close of the nineteenth and the commencement of the twentieth 
century, socialism began to gain momentum as a large-scale movement in Europe 
and the United States. This popularity was supported by an increased influence of 
the working class in society, which put pressure for representation upon European 
parliaments and began to secure concrete improvements in labor protection laws 
(Backhouse, 2002: 269). Moreover, socialist proponents looked hopefully towards 
the living example of the Soviet Union, which began its socialist experiment 
in 1917 following the success of the Bolshevik Revolution. Socialism, which 
found its economic grounding in the legacies of such men as David Ricardo and 
Karl Marx, tended to encourage a more central and vital role for government 
intervention in the economy. Thus economists who favored a socialist-oriented 
change in contemporary societies began to develop theories intended to address 
such issues as “where, when and how the state should intervene in economic life” 
(Backhouse, 2002: 269) and how societies might be successfully reorganized so 
as to be based upon these new precepts. 
These developing theories contrasted with those of the opposition 
contingent of both past and contemporary economists. As a result, a rich discourse 
of opposing ideologies appeared in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
coming from such men as Otto Neurath, Henry D. Dickinson, Maurice Dobb, 
and Oskar Lange on the socialist side, and Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von 
Hayek on the opposing. The debates, which focused on such subjects as the role 
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of the competitive market, central planning boards, prices, and entrepreneurial 
knowledge, were valuable to the participants not only in terms of their motives, 
which were often political, but also in that the very nature of the debates 
continuously challenged the economists and their theories. This encouraged 
deeper analysis, understanding, and innovation in the theories developed by 
economists on both sides of the dispute, allowing for stronger and more refined 
arguments. Oskar Lange himself, when speaking about a challenge made to 
socialist theories by Ludwig von Mises, wrote, “Socialists have certainly good 
reason to be grateful to Professor Mises, the great advocatus diaboli of their 
cause. For it was his powerful challenge that forced the socialists to recognize 
the . . . very existence of . . . a problem [in the system]” (Lange, 1938: 57). 
The theories that appeared at this time, especially with regards to Friedrich von 
Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments,” caused significant intellectual reverberations 
that continue to have implications in the socialist debate and economic discipline 
as a whole in recent economic dialogues. 
Hayek’s arguments are especially significant in their challenge to the 
traditional neoclassical conception of static equilibrium and of perfectly 
informed, uniform actors in a free-market economy that has “reached” this state 
of equilibrium. Hayek’s contribution is in conceptualizing a dynamic, consistently 
changing equilibrium that responds to and thus account more effectively the actions 
of individuals in those economies. This conceptualization allows economists to 
visualize and analyze market economies in a much more dynamic fashion and is 
particularly vital with regards to the current state of affairs in free-market societies 
worldwide. The world is in the midst of a charged atmosphere still experiencing 
the shocks of the 2008 financial crisis, the essential collapse of countries such as 
Greece and Ireland last year, and a generally pessimistic attitude about the ability 
for Western, free-market economies, especially the United States, to continue to 
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compete with countries experiencing growth at exponential rates, particularly 
China, a country that continues to follow a socialist model – albeit an evolved, 
complex one. The significance of Hayek’s arguments will not be in their ability to 
be any sort of band-aid to solve the Western world’s problems. However, they are 
also challenging, thought-provoking, and non-traditional arguments which could 
exist in a larger forum of debate and exchange that focuses upon forward-thinking 
economic theories that could help to revitalize stagnant or struggling free-market 
economies in the modern world. 
This paper will explore, first, the “socialist-calculation debate” of the 
early decades of the twentieth century between such scholars as Ludwig von 
Mises, Oskar Lange, and Friedrich von Hayek. One product of that debate was 
Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments,” which will be the second topic of focus in the 
paper. Finally, the third section of the paper will demonstrate different examples 
of theories developed in various economics circles in recent years, with special 
attention to those who claim foundation in Hayek’s work. These papers studied 
in this section include Israel M. Kirzner’s “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the 
Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach” (1997) and Fikret Adaman 
and Pat Devine’s “On the Economic Theory of Socialism” (1997). 
The Socialist-Calculation Debate
The Socialist-Calculation Debate, consisting of a series of arguments on 
the subject of the “possibility of a rational economic calculation in a socialist 
economic system” (Adaman and Devine, 1997: 55), opened with Enrico Barone’s 
1908 paper “The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State,” which outlined 
a mathematical model for a collectivist state, and continued into the 1920s and 
1930s with the opposing literature of the Austrian and Socialist schools (Adaman 
and Devine, 1997: 55).
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German Literature, 1920s
In 1920, Ludwig von Mises began the “German-language” segment of 
the debate with his “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” 
originally published in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften 1920, which challenged 
a number of proposed socialist models (Mises, 1972: 75-91). Mises sought to 
respond especially to Otto Neurath, who had written a paper in 1919 outlining 
a calculation theory based upon the example given by “war economy.” Neurath 
argued that during wartime, government assumes responsibility for the planning 
of material distribution, suppressing the market price system characteristic of 
peacetime. Moreover, production in wartime is not profit-seeking – which “leads 
to recurrent periods of over-production and unemployment” (Caldwell, 1997: 
1859) – but rather works to achieve maximum productive capacity. Neurath 
asserted that the “central planning” that occurred during war should continue 
during peace, with the government acting as a central “giant enterprise” (Caldwell, 
1997: 1859). He then went so far as to argue that money would be unnecessary in 
this new society in which “production would be driven by objectively determined 
needs rather than the search for profits . . . [and] all calculation regarding the 
appropriate levels of inputs and output could be handled in ‘natural’ physical 
terms” (Caldwell, 1997: 1859). 
Mises, a monetary theorist, especially disagreed with Neurath in terms of 
his plans for the dissolution of the monetary system, mentioning that, as money 
serves as a uniform means of exchange across different factors of production, “for 
the practical purposes of life monetary calculation always suffices. Were we to 
dispense with it, any economic system of calculation would become absolutely 
impossible” (Mises, 1972: 79). However, he also hoped to outline an obstacle for 
the conceptualization of the socialist order with or without the existence of money, 
so his response to Neurath went on to provide a model in which socialist states’ 
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ownership of capital, or factors of production, was assumed, therefore negating 
any competitive market for these goods. Mises saw this inclination as making it 
difficult, or perhaps impossible, for socialist states to assign value to inputs, and, 
thus, outputs (Caldwell, 1997: 1859). Essentially, without a competitive market, 
which, through the processes of supply and demand naturally and continuously 
determines prices and acts as an economic calculator of sorts, Mises argued, “in the 
socialist commonwealth every economic change becomes an undertaking whose 
success can be neither appraised in advance nor later retrospectively determined. 
There is only groping in the dark. Socialism is the abolition of rational economy” 
(Mises, 1972: 80). 
English Literature, 1930s
In the following decade, partly in response to a popular shift towards 
socialist thought that occurred in Britain as demonstrated by a variety of groups, 
including political and labor parties as well as academics (Caldwell, 1997: 1859-
60), English literature took up the debate. Friedrich von Hayek, who was at the 
forefront of this movement, built and elaborated upon arguments begun by Ludwig 
von Mises during the 1920s and formulated a series of critiques of socialism, 
addressing in his works the arguments of such men as Henry D. Dickinson and 
Maurice Dobb, and later, Oskar Lange. One of Hayek’s first obstacles was to 
tackle Dickinson’s proposal of the possibility of mathematical calculation to 
determine values in a socialist society through the employment of Léon Walras’ 
system of equations and the utilization of the “auctioneer.” In Dickinson’s plan, 
a central planning board using this “Walrasian set of equations” would take on 
the function of the market as the determinant of prices (Caldwell, 1997: 1860). 
Hayek, in response, outlined a variety of issues with Dickinson’s system: first, 
the collection and processing of large amounts of necessary information; second, 
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the difficulty associated with formulating and solving the required equations; 
and, third, the static nature of such a system and its inability to compete with the 
natural adaptations of a free market (Caldwell, 1997: 1860). 
Hayek continued this trend of underlining the difficulties associated with 
suggested socialist solutions in his critique of Maurice Dobb’s contention that “if 
consumption decisions were subjected to central control, most of the problems 
associated with central planning would be alleviated” (Caldwell, 1997: 1861). 
Hayek rejected this claim, arguing that this change would likely be unacceptable 
to a society such as Great Britain, or others like it, which was accustomed to 
a system of consumer freedom. Also in this critique, Hayek addressed “market 
socialism,” which had not been concretely proposed as yet but was in theory an 
alternative to what its adherents saw as a distorted capitalist system, in which 
the market was no longer truly free or competitive, but rather dominated by 
corporations and monopolies (Caldwell, 1997: 1861). By imagining a system 
in which “managers of monopolized industries [would be] directed to produce 
so that prices covered marginal costs . . . duplicating the results of competitive 
equilibrium,” (Caldwell, 1997: 1861) Hayek addressed a few issues which, 
at that point, were rather underdeveloped, but which he would go on to better 
conceptualize in his later works. These obstacles were the difficulty for a socialist 
order to replace entrepreneurs acting in a free market, and the issue of managerial 
incentives in a society that was not profit-oriented (Caldwell, 1997: 1861). 
The Lange Debates On Market Socialism
Oskar Lange, a Polish immigrant based in the United States, also wrote 
on the subject of market socialism; however, he acted as its ardent advocate, 
entering the discourse during the latter half of the 1930s to respond first to Mises 
and later to Hayek. In his paper “On the Economic Theory of Socialism,” first 
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published in Review of Economic Studies in 1936-7, and again as a book in 1938, 
Lange’s framework proposed a free market for both consumer goods and labor 
in conjunction with public ownership of capital and other means of production, 
which he argued would reduce – although not eliminate – social gaps, given the 
lack of income disparity that originates in private capital ownership (Lange, 1972: 
92-3). Lange’s model required given prices determined by a Central Planning 
Board so as to allow for a “subjective equilibrium condition” in which there 
is a “combination of factors which minimizes average cost, [a level of] output 
which equalizes marginal cost and the price of the product, and the best allocation 
of the ultimate productive resources” (Lange, 1972: 97). Lange’s model then 
necessarily rejected Mises’ argument that the market must be the determinant of 
prices, arguing instead that the “parametric function of prices” which occurs in 
competitive markets is retained in a system of fixed prices (Lange, 1972: 98-9). 
Lange’s paper also addressed and refuted Hayek’s computation argument (in 
which Hayek outlined the difficulty of computation given the breadth of required 
information for equations and subsequent issue of solving those equations). 
Lange claimed that “the only equations which would have to be ‘solved’ would 
be those of the consumers and the managers of production” whereby, to solve 
these equations, consumers need only to spend their income and managers of 
production need only to produce at those levels determined by the equilibrium 
requirements as previously defined in this section (Lange, 1972: 103). Moreover, 
those prices required by the managers of production to determine their production 
levels should be subject to a “trial and error” method of adjustment for price 
finding, in which the prices are raised or lowered according to whether there is a 
surplus or shortage of their respective goods. Given their broader knowledge base 
and attention to the market, Lange believed the Central Planning Board setting the 
prices and making the necessary adjustments would actually be better suited for 
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this role than private entrepreneurs, allowing for a shorter process of movement 
towards equilibrium than occurred the competitive market (Lange, 1972: 103-
104). 
While Mises never explicitly responded to Lange’s challenge, he continued 
to reject socialist proposals in his writings, focusing on refuting the socialist 
proposition of a centrally planned mechanism for determining prices. He saw 
prices as having a very specific determinant; that is, “‘[prices are] brought 
about by the interplay of the valuations of all individuals participating in the 
operation of the market’” (Mises, 1966: 331, cf. Caldwell, 1997: 1863). This 
entrepreneurially-based scope allowed for an adaptive market that socialism 
simply could not reproduce as “the ever-changing structure of prices that exists 
within a market system, the messy groping that appears so archaic, ends up 
being a passably efficient system for revealing relative scarcities” (Caldwell, 
1997: 1863). In this system, the entrepreneur is “the essential actor of the piece” 
(Caldwell, 1997: 1863) reacting to and, in fact, causing changes in the market; 
for example, “where shortages have existed . . . the resulting price increases 
[are] driven by entrepreneurs recognizing, in the face of the uncertainty of the 
real world, the profit opportunities available” (Kirzner, 1997: 70). According to 
Mises, the competitive market system, which tends to include explicit private 
property laws and a propensity towards profit-maximizing actions, is a necessary 
prerequisite to the role of Mises’ entrepreneur, therefore, in socialist economies, 
the equilibrating actions of the entrepreneur would be null and void. 
Hayek, like Mises, continued to write arguments against socialist systems, 
and, in his own response to Lange, not only made use of his earlier addressed 
objections to the mathematical calculation system proposed by Dickinson, but also 
outlined new issues, such as the nature of equilibrium and the role of knowledge 
in the market.
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Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments
Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments,” a series of papers published in the 
late 1930s and throughout the 1940s, explored the nature of equilibrium and 
especially the process by which that state is reached, and, in so doing, issued a 
challenge to both traditional assumptions about static equilibrium and socialist 
theorists. His argument focused on the role of knowledge in competitive markets, 
responding directly to Lange’s contention that a Central Planning Board would 
better determine prices than individuals participating in a naturally fluctuating 
free market. Many scholars have asserted that the arguments presented in these 
pieces were “seminal . . . both in development of Hayek’s ideas and in [their] 
implications for the calculation debate” (Caldwell, 1997: 1865). His ideas were 
first presented in his 1937 “Economics and Knowledge,” and were further refined 
and developed in later works such as his 1945 “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” 
“Economics and Knowledge,” 1937
 “Economics and Knowledge,” which was featured in a 1937 issue of 
Economica, sought to outline a more definite and clear concept of equilibrium. 
Essential to this concept was Hayek’s departure from a “pure theory of stationary 
equilibrium,” which neither accounts for change nor for time and also assumes 
uniform, perfect knowledge among individuals, making the models based upon 
these premises inapplicable to real world situations. Hayek’s study of knowledge, 
denoted as “data,” begins with a distinction between “objective real facts, as the 
observing economist is supposed to know them,” and “subjective [data] as things 
known to the persons whose behavior we try to explain” (Hayek, 1937: 39). 
Thus, a state of equilibrium only lasts so long as the “external data correspond to 
the common experiences of all the members of the society” (Hayek, 1937: 41). 
Understanding equilibrium in this manner breaks the restraints of stationary models 
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and allows for equilibrium analysis to be applied to more realistic, “progressive” 
society.  Also important to this line of argument, however, is Hayek’s careful 
mention that his distinction does not intend to imply that there is not a relationship 
between subjective data, or individual plans, and objective data, or external facts. 
Rather, “subjective data of different people [would never] correspond unless they 
were due to the experience of the same objective facts” (Hayek, 1937: 43). 
Furthermore, this correspondence of knowledge and intentions by 
entrepreneurs in the market as Hayek understands it is an evolutionary process 
with a consistent tendency towards equilibrium as economic actors “come more 
and more into agreement . . . [or] become more and more correct” (Hayek, 1937: 
44). This tendency, (which does not necessarily ever lead to an absolute state 
of equilibrium) or the process “by which individual knowledge is changed,” is 
Hayek’s next subject. He asserts that economists should remember “how little 
we actually know about the conditions under which an equilibrium will ever be 
reached” (Hayek, 1937: 48). This limitation derives from a “‘constancy of the 
data’” as a condition of equilibrium. This constancy does not exist in the real world, 
as individuals consistently change their expectations and subsequent actions “as 
they gain experience about the external facts and other people’s actions,” leading 
to a continuous and seemingly infinite process of changes (Hayek, 1937: 47-8). 
While this process is of interest to Hayek, it is in the ensuing analysis of 
the nature of knowledge – “how much and what sort different individuals possess” 
– that his most interesting insights come to light (Hayek, 1937: 48). He begins 
by assuming individually “‘relevant knowledge,’” which, when taken together, 
allow for a “spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each possessing only 
bits of knowledge, [to] bring about a state of affairs in which prices correspond 
to costs” – in other words, a “Division of Knowledge” similar in function to the 
much-studied division of labor (Hayek, 1937: 49, emphasis in the original). This 
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knowledge, is, again, consistently changing as individuals become aware of new 
facts. It is a learning process that may occur either completely by accident or 
through the unexpected results of any executed action. Therefore, “it is only 
relative to the knowledge which a person is bound to acquire in the course of the 
carrying out of his original plan and its successive alteration that an equilibrium 
is likely to be reached” (Hayek, 1937: 51). In other words, Hayek argued that a 
greater understanding and, moreover, refinement of this “division of knowledge” 
theory would allow for economists to better comprehend the equilibrating nature 
of the market. Hayek saw this issue as the 
central question of all social sciences, how the combination of fragments 
of knowledge existing in different minds can bring about results which, 
if they were to be brought about deliberately, would require a knowledge 
on the part of the directing mind which no single person can possess. To 
show that in this sense the spontaneous action of individuals will under 
conditions which we can define bring about a distribution of resources 
which can be understood as if it were made according to a single plan, 
although nobody has planned it, seems to me indeed an answer to the 
problem which has sometimes been metaphorically described as that of 
the ‘social mind’ (Hayek, 1937: 52). 
Hayek concludes that, economists, then, should attempt to find a way to 
deliberately put to use all of this knowledge so as to better fathom the evolutionary 
process of equilibrium and to formulate a model which would, in application, 
allow for a closer state of absolute equilibrium than present models and states. 
Hayek continued to refine these theories in the next few years of his career, and 
thus Hayek’s later work, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” delves deeper into, 
and therefore more clearly expresses, the arguments formed in the 1937 paper. 
“The Use of Knowledge In Society,” 1945
 Published in the fall 1945 issue of The American Economic Review, 
“The Use of Knowledge in Society” begins by asking the question, “What 
is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational economic 
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order?” (Hayek, 1945: 519). Hayek, in contrast to the traditional practice of 
seeking to solve this economic calculation problem by employing a system of 
given preferences and perfect knowledge, underscores that a proposed calculation 
which at least attempts to be applicable to society must make use of the “dispersed 
bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate 
individuals possess” (Hayek, 1945: 519). This problem naturally deals with the 
concept of planning – in the traditional definition of the word, taken to mean the 
decisions pertaining to the allocation of resources within a society – and, more 
specifically, the “planners” making those decisions. The debate, then, over the 
advantages of either central planning, in which there is one plan determined from 
above, or competition, in which there is decentralized planning by many different 
individuals acting in the market, should be resolved by answering the question 
of which system makes better use of this dispersed knowledge. In order to make 
this determination, a better definition of the different kinds knowledge and their 
relative significances is required. 
 Hayek differentiates between scientific knowledge and tacit knowledge, 
defining the former as “those which we should with greater confidence expect to 
find in the possession of an authority made up of suitably chosen experts” and 
the latter as “more likely to be at the disposal of particular individuals . . . the 
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” (Hayek, 1945: 521). 
While greater emphasis is generally placed upon scientific knowledge, Hayek 
argues that tacit knowledge should hold equal import given that “practically 
every individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique 
information of which beneficial use might be made” (Hayek, 1945: 522). This 
information is formed by way of a wide array of sources, such as popular or 
localized publications or advertisements; isolated interactions between 
entrepreneurs; or individual desires – all “special knowledge of circumstances of 
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the fleeting moment not known to others” (Hayek, 1945: 522). Moreover, through 
the process of acting in the competitive market, knowledge is consistently and 
continuously changing, constituting an ongoing discovery process. The nature of 
tacit knowledge, then, is such that it cannot be expressed numerically, making it 
impossible to integrate in a calculation-based socialist order, while at the same 
time acting as a natural component of a responsive capitalist system (Hayek, 
1945: 524). 
 The second half of Hayek’s 1945 paper focuses upon arguments in support 
of the price mechanism. Hayek argues that prices function not only a medium of 
exchange but also as a conveyor of information. They are a “kind of machinery for 
registering change, or a system of telecommunications which enables individual 
producers to watch merely the movement of a few pointers . . . in order to adjust 
their activities to changes of which they may never know more than is reflected in 
the price movement” (Hayek, 1945: 527). The nature of the price mechanism is 
one the primary tenets of Hayek’s argument against those who would advocate for 
“‘conscious direction,’” (central planners or socialist economists) because one of 
the most miraculous features of the price mechanism is that it has “evolved without 
design” (Hayek, 1945: 527). In this sense, it is one of many social institutions 
which could not be instantaneously replicated, or worse, replaced with different 
systems, because they exist as part of an evolutionary process consisting of many 
generations of improvements and development in which success is achieved “by 
building upon habits and institutions which have proved successful in their own 
sphere and which have in turn become the foundation of the civilization we have 
built up . . . [having originally] stumbled upon [them] without understanding” 
(Hayek, 1945: 528). 
From Hayek’s perspective, then, the socialist proposal was doomed 
from the start, because it intended to transform society at its very roots, therefore 
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undermining and, in fact, nullifying those evolutionary processes Hayek outlined. 
The contemporary implications of Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments” were 
therefore not small; he underscored an issue for both mainstream and alternative 
school proponents by challenging traditional equilibrium assumptions as well as 
outlining a system in which the applicability and efficiency of socialist models 
could not compare to competitive market processes which encouraged the best 
utilization of dispersed knowledge. The exact nature and significance of these 
implications continue to be debated and built upon in modern economic circles. 
Modern Implications of the Knowledge Arguments
 The concepts expressed in Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments – dispersed 
knowledge among individuals; the discovery process surrounding that knowledge 
in a competitive market setting; the nature and role of tacit knowledge; and the 
function of prices as conveyors of information about the market – have been 
significant in different ways for different schools of modern economists. 
The Austrian School
The modern Austrian school’s conceptualization of the market is 
influenced by both Mises’ lesson of the market being driven by profit-oriented 
entrepreneurs as well as Hayek’s contribution of an understanding of the role, 
nature and continuous augmentation of knowledge in the market (Kirnzer, 
1997: 67). Additionally, Austrians have learned to appreciate the function of 
competition with regards Hayek’s discovery procedure in that “for the modern 
Austrian approach, this perception of competition as the dynamic, driving force 
for discovery in the market process has become central” (Kirzner, 1997: 69). The 
Austrian School, then, represents a break with standard neoclassical economics 
in that the Austrians do not see the static equilibrium model that focuses its 
interest on the endpoint as being sufficient to explain or understand what happens 
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in actual market economies. Moreover, while neoclassical economics no longer 
tends to adhere to the time-honored assumption of perfect information, it has done 
comparatively little to address the role of the discovery process as outlined in 
Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments. 
In this sense, the Austrian school’s work exists as the most orthodox 
modern application of Hayek’s theories, as Hayek’s “idea that ‘the pure theory 
of stationary equilibrium’ is inadequate as a tool for understanding the workings 
of a market economy, and that it should be replaced by a view of the market 
as a competitive-entrepreneurial process for the discovery and coordination of 
knowledge, has become a central tenet of Austrian thought” (Caldwell, 1997: 
1866). The Austrian school is the best representation of Hayek’s legacy within 
modern economic circles, and it is the only school that employs Hayek’s arguments 
together in understanding the market, equilibrium, and the processes behind each 
of these phenomena. 
The Socialist School
The Knowledge Arguments have been significant for modern socialist 
economists as well, especially for those that have made attempts to reconcile 
Hayek’s arguments with socialist systems. For example, in Fikret Adaman and 
Pat Devine’s “On the Economic Theory of Socialism,” printed in a 1997 issue of 
New Left Review, the authors advocate for a system of participatory planning, in 
which “the values of individuals and collectives interact and shape one another 
through a process of cooperation and negotiation . . .  [enabling] tacit knowledge 
to be articulated and economic life to be consciously controlled and coordinated” 
(Adaman and Devine, 1997: 75).  Their proposed model differentiates between 
“market exchange” and “market forces,” in which market exchange is taken to 
mean “‘transactions between buyers and sellers’” and market forces refers to 
93
“‘the process whereby changes are brought about in the underlying allocation of 
resources, the relative size of different industries, the geographical distribution 
of economic activity” (Devine, 1992: 79-80, cf. Adaman and Devine, 1997: 76). 
Market exchange, then, encourages information to be generated through 
the participation of individuals acting in the market, which then makes the best use 
of existing productive capacity while also determining any necessary changes that 
will need to be made in the structure of that capacity for better future usage. Market 
forces, on the other hand, will not be incorporated into the participatory setting, 
planned instead from above. Through this combination of free participation in the 
market with planning from above, the authors attempt to express a model in which 
Hayek’s concept of tacit knowledge can, in fact, be incorporated into a socialist 
economy. The issue with this model is that Hayek’s concept of an individual acting 
in the market resembles Mises’ profit-motivated entrepreneur, and so does not 
tend, as in Adaman and Devine’s model, to “promote cooperation and recognition 
of interdependent common interest” (Adaman and Devine, 1997: 78), but rather 
makes choices that are motivated by profit (Kirzner, 1997: 78). This orientation 
towards profit is the driving force behind Hayek’s discovery process, thus, while 
Adaman and Devine’s system accounts for tacit knowledge, it still misses some 
of Hayek’s main points. 
Adaman and Devine, however, differ from many other socialist 
economists in at least seeking to integrate Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments 
into their models. There have been a variety of other socialist models recently 
proposed which do not take into account the insights of Hayek’s work, especially 
ignoring the role of tacit knowledge. One of these models is outlined in Pranab 
Bardhan and John Roemer’s work, expressed in such papers as their 1992 
“Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation,” which focuses on the issues of 
calculation and motivation instead of knowledge, and, through a “bank-centric 
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system of insider monitoring” seeks to solve the managerial motivation problem 
(Bardhan and Roemer, 1992: 105). Echoing Oskar Lange’s claims, their system’s 
“main bank and the group partners . . . have more “inside” information . . . [and] 
are likely to be capable of detecting . . . trouble more easily than a diffuse body 
of stockholders” (Bardhan and Roemer, 1992: 109). In this sense, Bardhan and 
Roemer outline a model which may seem applicable to real world situations, but, 
like Lange before them, do not account for the role of knowledge as expressed by 
Hayek in their work. The differences between Adaman and Devine and Bardhan 
and Roemer’s theories, which both exist in the realm of market socialist theories, 
illustrate the nature of the debate that surrounds socialism today, even from within, 
as socialist economists continue to search for a working model which accounts for 
their opponents’ challenges. 
Conclusion
 Friedrich von Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments stand as both some of his 
most insightful and significant work as well as noteworthy developments in the 
greater scope of economic thought as a whole. They had implications both within 
Hayek’s own contemporary economic circles, especially with regards to the 
socialist-calculation debate, and continue to influence economic theorists today. 
The propagation of Hayek’s concepts is particularly evident in the “alternative” 
Austrian school of thought, which, like Hayek, challenges neoclassical standards 
to move closer to real world situations so as to create applicable, working models 
for market economies. Also notable, modern socialist economists such as Fikret 
Adaman and Pat Devine have worked to address Hayek’s theories, attempting to 
integrate at least some of the ideas into a workable socialist model. 
This continuing debate mirrors that of the development of the Knowledge 
Arguments themselves. Hayek was a key economist among those participating 
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in the socialist-calculation debate, and, therefore, it follows that the Arguments 
developed as a product of that debate, in one of his many attempts to challenge 
his opponents. As Israel Kirzner maintains, the socialist-calculation debate was 
a “catalyst in the development and articulation of the modern Austrian view as a 
competitive-entrepreneurial process of discovery . . . it was through the give-and-
take of this debate that the Austrians gradually refined their own position” (Kirzner, 
1988: 1, cf. Lavoie, 1985, cf. Caldwell, 1997: 1861) In this sense, the evolution of 
the Knowledge Arguments demonstrates a broader tendency of economists to rely 
upon debates within and between different circles of thought to better develop 
their theories and, ultimately, to come to a more complete understanding of the 
world around them, and, more importantly, apply that understanding with the 
hopes of improving that world. 
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History of Usury
The Transition of Usury Through Ancient Greece, The Rise of 
Christianity and Islam, And the Expansion of 
Long-Distance Trade and Capitalism
Cheryl Olechnowicz
Introduction to Usury
Society and its ideas, markets, and institutions are in the constant process 
of change.   These transforming factors contribute to the evolution of economics. 
Usury is one prominent economic issue that demonstrates this evolution.  As it has 
developed, usury, the lending of money at interest or excessive interest, has been 
debated for almost two millennia (Visser, 1998, Usury).  
During the lifetime of Aristotle, 384-322 B.C., the lending of money 
for profit was believed to be unnatural and dishonorable (Madra, 2010, Ancient 
Greece).  Aristotle and his beliefs of usury provided a foundation of ideas for future 
perspectives on the practice.  This negative connotation associated with usury 
continued in history as is evident in the development and spread of Christianity and 
Islam during the Middle Ages.   The Christian church drew on biblical passages and 
moral and religious reasons to define usury as a sin.  The Church placed a ban on the 
practice of usury to prevent this “evil”.   In Islam, the Quran and the teachings of the 
Prophet Muhammad led Muslims to also view usury as a crime.  
As the world has developed, usury has lost its negative connotation in 
the West and has become a social norm.  The Christian church has lifted its ban 
on usury while a gradual decrease of the importance of religion is seen.  Long-
distance trade has developed which also contributes to the increasing emergence 
of usury. The expanse of trade has led to more people being involved in the market 
and the augmentation of new ideas on usury.  
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The rise of capitalism too has affected societies’ views of usury.  Capitalism 
does incur the making of self-profit as well as rates of interest.  Both of these would 
have been looked down upon in Aristotle’s time and the Middle Ages.   In the present 
however, the West has grown accustomed to capitalism.  Interest rates do not carry 
any negative connotation and usury is no longer considered a sin.  
The Christian church and Islam both drew on Aristotle’s beliefs on usury 
to help develop their own disapproving views of the practice.  However, as time 
passed, society developed economically and socially and the Church lifted its 
ban on usury.  Islam has developed as well, yet it still continues to view usury as 
detrimental to society.   The debate on usury has witnessed countless arguments 
over the past two millenniums, and it will continue to perceive them due to varying 
opinions and the religious passages in the Bible and the Quran.   
History of Usury
Aristotle was revered for his contributions to philosophy and economics. 
His writings and ideas on usury were significant in Ancient Greece and his 
influence continues to be seen today.  Aristotle distinguished between natural and 
unnatural exchange to define his view on usury.   Natural and unnatural exchange 
is also known as arête (the art of being a good citizen) versus chrematistike (the 
acquisition of wealth) (Madra, 2010, Ancient Greece).   
The discrepancy between the two types of exchange heavily influenced 
people’s thought in Ancient Greece and the Middle Ages.  As time progressed, this 
difference became less important, and it ultimately contributed to a less critical 
view of usury.  On this distinction of exchange he says the following: 
 “There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of 
household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable, 
while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and 
a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the 
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greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from 
the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to 
increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from 
money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the 
parent. Wherefore of a modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural” (Aristotle, 
mid 300 B.C., cited from Medema, 2003, Excerpts from Politics).
To understand the quote one must comprehend the Greek polis; or an 
independent city state where the citizens have a large role in their public life 
(Backhouse, 2002, p. 23).  In order to survive and carry out their civic role, the 
citizens required materials to continue living on their estate.  This was termed 
“household management” which was considered to be perfectly natural exchange. 
The people did take part in trade, however only for necessary items they could not 
produce themselves.  This is the reason Aristotle terms natural trade “necessary 
and honorable” (Aristotle, mid 300 B.C., cited from Medema, 2003, Excerpts 
from Politics).
People involved in this household management therefore had a limit on 
the natural amount of wealth they could accumulate.  The ultimate goal for the 
Ancient Greeks was to obtain the “good life” which entailed being a citizen of 
the polis (which as explained above entailed household management).  Aristotle 
believed in this good life and urged people to acquire it.  
Unnatural trade involved one person benefiting from another, an action 
viewed as usury.  The excessive accumulation of wealth solely for profit was 
considered abnormal and ethically wrong.  One would be acting rationally for 
their “self interest”.  If in doing so, one disregards others, then acting in “self 
interest” is viewed as wrong. 
The Greeks viewed usury as the “most hated sort” of trade (Aristotle, mid 
300 B.C., cited from Medema, 2003, Excerpts from Politics).   Lending money at 
a high interest rate was using money to make a profit.   This was frowned upon 
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because money was meant to be used for exchange, not for making more money. 
Aristotle viewed unnatural exchange as a producer of avarice which led to social 
problems (Kozel, 2006, p.20) He believed that people obsessed with attaining 
wealth, would be too preoccupied to participate in the polis and fail to perform 
their civic duties (Kozel, 2006, p. 25).
Aristotelian thought is continued and reflected in the Christian church 
during the Middle Ages.  Religion is combined with Aristotle’s ideas to influence 
economic thought on usury during this time period.  Citizens involved in trade 
questioned whether profit was considered moral.   They turned toward the Church 
to address this problem.   They looked at Jesus who had his followers give up all 
their possessions (Backhouse, 2002, p.33).   Saints were respected and followed, 
yet not as extreme.   Some Saints did not believe in owning property, because they 
did not want people to become obsessed with the accumulation of it (Backhouse, 
2002, p.34).  This fixation with acquiring wealth has always been one main 
argument against usury.  
The Saints in the Christian church reflect Aristotle’s negative views on 
wealth.  St. Paul urged people to give up their worldly possessions (Madra, 2010, 
Middle Ages).  They would not have wealth and they would not be distracted with 
the goal of accumulating money.  St. Augustine argues that “wealth should be a 
means not an end” (Madra, 2010, Middle Ages).  St. Augustine is agreeing with 
Aristotle that the natural exchange of money is deemed appropriate.  People need 
enough money as a “means” to survive.  It should not be an “end” and the only 
goal in one’s life.  
The Church and the Saints supported a ban on usury by drawing from 
Aristotle as well as from the Bible.  The following biblical passage swayed many 
Christians that usury was a sin.
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“But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing 
again; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest: 
He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil” (Luke vi: 35, cited from Nelson, 
1949, p.8).
When Christians heard the word of a disciple speak of lending but “hoping for 
nothing”, they followed their example and adhered to it.  The Church thus placed 
a ban on usury for these religious and moral reasons.  
 The Crusades also posed an economic reason for the prohibition of lending 
with interest.  Usurers were seen as taking advantage of profits in “commodity 
corners and loans on the security of lands” that had been placed on the market by 
nobles gone to fight (Nelson, 1949, pg.7). With the elimination of these usurers, 
these profits would then be directed toward the promotion of the crusades instead. 
For efficient and influential promotion of the Crusades, several Popes required the 
inhibition of usurers (Nelson, 1949, pg.7).  Leading up to the Crusades, discussion 
on the definition of a usurer had been unclear.  The Popes then curtailed all usury 
to solidify the distinction.   These actions let it be clear that one of the motives 
for the Crusades was the elimination of usury.  The Crusades also experienced 
much land being placed on the market by men fighting in the Holy Wars (Nelson, 
1949, pg.7).  Usurers then exploited the market, seeking profit from the absence of 
these warriors. While Christianity opposed usury, Islam was seen holding similar 
views.
 The decline of the Roman Empire was followed by the growth of Islam. 
The golden age of Islam continued to see religious and Aristotelian influences. 
Muslims drew on these influences to develop their argument that usury was 
morally and ethically wrong.   The Prophet Muhammad argued that no interest 
should be required in transactions (Madra, 2010, Middle Ages).  Muhammad was 
as admired and esteemed as Aristotle; and the ideas of the two men were revered.
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 The Qur’an, similar to the Bible, contains passages advising against the 
practice of usury.  The Muslim word for excess when speaking of usury is riba.  Riba 
is defined as lending money for interest without any risk to the lender (Jones, 1989, 
Islam and Usury).  The following Qur’anic passage addresses the issue of riba. 
 “O you who believe! Eat no Riba (usury)” (Jones, 1989, cited from the 
Qur’an, Al Imran 3:130).
 The ethics explained in the Qur’an were not to be reconciled with.   In addition 
to the Qur’an, several Hadith were composed urging against the practice.  The 
Hadith are narrations written describing the words and actions of Muhammad to 
provide them as a guide on how Muslims should lead their lives (Brown, 2009, 
p.89). 
 Muslim scholars emphasize the “consumable nature” of money and how 
it can lead to the distraction of an individual (Jones, 1989, Islam and Usury). 
The Qur’anic passage supports this view and helps Muslims understand the 
divine adverseness to usury.  Muslims believe that God “permits trade yet forbids 
usury” (Visser, 1998, Usury).  In the market individuals can make a profit through 
determination and efficiency in which a value-creating process occurs.  While 
interest is set, profit is susceptible to change.  One must work to guarantee that 
they receive profit, while with interest one knows the amount that they will receive 
(Visser, 1998, Usury).
 Many Muslims view usury as the exploitation of the poor.   Making 
money by abusing an economic relationship with the poor is strongly urged 
against.  In Islamic society they have a Principle of Distributive Equity that its 
economy aims to maintain (Visser, 1998, Usury).  Usury prevents this equity from 
being reached.  Usury is viewed as making the wealthy more affluent, and the 
poor more deprived.
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 Usury is defined by many as a love for money.  However, this passion 
for wealth is only one defining aspect of usury.  Many, including the Church and 
philosophers, criticize usury not only because it is considered an act of greed, 
but also because it is delineated by the negative morals that one exhibits when 
one performs usury.  Some philosophers and religious advisors disparage usury 
because it is the act of taking advantage of others.  It is a disruption on individuals 
when they are consumed with the idea of making money, and they may neglect their 
other duties to society and their families.  In addition to greed, the consequences 
on individuals due to partaking in usury are reasons in themselves to vilify the act. 
Changing and Persisting Views on Usury
 History has seen a great deal of change in society and the economy. 
Throughout the world, expansion has occurred and markets have developed. 
Change is inevitable and is seen every day.  A decrease in the importance of 
religion, the emergence of long-distance trade, and the development capitalism 
has had an effect on many people’s views on usury.
  In the West, an emanation of trade has posed new thoughts on individuals’ 
actions and decisions in the market. The decreasing importance of religion along 
with decreasing government censorship contributed to more new economic ideas. 
These emerging ideas influenced peoples’ shifting opinions on usury.  In the West, 
usury no longer carries a negative connotation and it is no longer viewed as a sin. 
 The world has evolved and trade has become more complex and 
defined.  In the current globalized world, making profit is present and abundant 
in the economy.   Making profit off of others is seen in exchange between two 
individuals and exchange on a global scale.  Profit drives the market and keeps 
society in motion.  Although some disapprove of the practice, usury is now a 
widely accepted social behavior.  
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Long-distance trade resulted in the creation of industries and 
commercialism.  These then led to towns to support these markets and merchant 
capitalists became prominent (Hunt, 2002, p12).  The number of people involved 
in the market and in trade has increased.  As this number became augmented, 
people became to accept usury more.
The Church lifted its ban on usury around the 18th century as the 
practice was widely debated.   No clear answer on its permittance was found. 
One philosopher states that while religion has influenced most laws, such as 
the Christian church and usury, its effects have gradually been “purged away 
during the past two centuries so that today there is almost nothing is left of them” 
(Berman, 1974, p.26).
 Many view the crisis of religion being present in law as a result from the 
decrease in self-identification with religion and the Church (Berman, 1974, p.95). 
A society whose political and religious aspects have no principles of change is 
believed by some to be a society in danger (Berman, 1974, p.139).  As stated 
previously, change is inevitable and societies must adjust to the evolving times.
As history unfolded, the Church came to realize that usury was 
economically detrimental to itself.  During the Middle Ages, monasteries that 
existed were capable of lending money (Noonan, 2005, p.131).  However, usury 
was banned and therefore the monasteries did not participate in such practices. 
As the twelfth century passed economists saw urban churches develop.  These 
churches were also available to lend money (Noonan, 2005, p.131). These 
economic reasons, combined with an increase in long-distance trade and changing 
ideas, contributed to the lifting of the usury ban.
The Enlightenment philosophers and the ideas of Adam Smith helped 
influence a lifting on the ban of usury.  In the past acting in one’s own “self-
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interest” helped define usury.  However, ideas such as Smith’s thoughts on 
public good and on society shed new light on the debate.  Self-interest is argued 
to be congruent with a flourishing society.  Smith’s Wealth of Nations describes 
how a society can prosper even while individuals act in their own self interest 
(Backhouse, 2002, p.123).   While this is possible, he emphasizes that justice must 
be present in order for society to function properly.
The emergence of capitalism and a free market changed the West’s view 
on usury.   Capitalism led to the break-up of medieval feudalism which was an 
economic system that supported usury (Hunt, 2002, p.11).  Privately owning 
inputs for production and making a profit became more common and excepted. 
Capitalism has many definitions, and many individuals began to define it as 
“honest trade and entrepreneurialism” (Visser, 1998, Usury).   
The influence of capitalism was seen as early as the Middle Ages.  A 
subtle shift towards accepting usury is present in loans during this time period. 
Individuals involved in the market agreed that if the “lender shared in the risk of 
the venture, the loan was legal” and it was not prohibited (Jones, 1989, Islam and 
Usury).  Laws prohibiting usury rarely intervened with commercial capitalism. 
Merchants were able to receive a loan if their agreements made them susceptible 
to risk as well (Jones, 1989, Islam and Usury).  
As commercialism became more prominent, a pro-capitalism movement 
developed in response to a pro-usury movement (Visser, 1998, Usury). The pro-
capitalism movement certainly contained more momentum and support.  Usury 
gradually was changing from being viewed as a morally wrong act against others, 
to being viewed as a more personal action which was not considered ethically 
wrong.  
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While the West experienced a major shift in its view on usury, Islam has 
held fast to its negative connotation on the practice.  It has developed with the 
changing world, but ultimately Islam has not altered its view.
Many Muslims continue to view usury as detrimental to society. 
Religiously, the Muslims adhere strictly to their sacred texts and the teachings of 
their Prophets.  They do not easily allow modern times to change their opinion on 
their traditions.  Concerning capitalism, the Islamic perspective speaks that “the 
greatest problem in the capitalist economy is that of the crises and interest which 
plays a peculiar part in bringing about the crises” (Visser, 1998, Usury).
The evolution of the market economy is unavoidable and the Muslims 
are seen adjusting to it.  To continue being an active participant in the developing 
world, Muslims have established a new system of Islamic banks.  These banks 
do lend money, however they do not do so usuriously (Jones, 1989, Islam and 
Usury). The banks are expected to share the risk concerning money with the 
borrower.  Agreements made between the borrower and lenders of the banks do 
not entail a “predetermined amount over and above principle” (Jones, 1989, Islam 
and Usury).  Money must not be made from money.
In the 1960s, the first modern bank was created in Egypt, and the 
consecutive three decades have seen great expansion of the system (Visser, 1998, 
Usury).   By doing so, Muslims are attempting to make their national banks 
function in accord with the teaching of Muhammad and the Qur’an.  Muslims 
claim that their system of banks provides a stable, equitable, and more lucrative, 
system of lending (Visser, 1998, Usury).   
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Conclusion
The debate over usury has been intriguing philosophers, economists, and 
society for the past two millenniums.  Countless religious, social, and economic 
reasons are utilized to argue for and against the practice.   
Beginning with ancient Greece around 300 B.C., Aristotle is seen 
emerging with ideas opposing usury.  His arguments of natural versus un-natural 
trade influence people of his time as well as provide the foundation for future 
arguments.  An emphasis is placed on the importance of the Greek polis and the 
citizens’ duty and involvement in it.  He urges individuals not to be caught up in 
greed and money making so that they will be able to fulfill their civic duties. 
Christianity and Islam emerge during the Middle Ages and draw on 
Aristotle’s teachings.   Each respective religion also is seen reviewing sacred texts 
to support a ban on usury.   The Christian church and its Saints explain how usury 
is morally wrong.  They argue how one can be corrupted for exploiting others and 
being consumed with making a profit.  Islam draws on Muhammad’s teachings 
and the Qur’an to prohibit usury.  They argue for equity among all; and they frown 
upon usury as it can take advantage of the poor.
Long-distance trade, capitalism, and a decrease on the emphasis of 
religion appeared as time passed and the world evolved.  More people became 
involved in the markets and trade became more prominent. New ideas and 
thoughts on usury emerged as it became a more common practice.
In the West, most of society accepts usury and no longer considers it a 
sin or a socially unmoral practice.  The decline in the importance of religion has 
contributed to this.  The sacred texts and the traditions of the Church have less 
influence on individuals and their actions in the economy.   
108
Islam however has not experienced such a change of viewpoints on 
usury.  Muslims continue to see the practice as ethically wrong.  In response to the 
evolving world, modern Islamic banks have developed.  These banks do not lend 
money usuriously; and they were created so that all national banks will adhere to 
Muslim religious law.
The teachings of Aristotle and the sacred texts of both Islam and 
Christianity will always be available for discussion.  Philosophers and economists 
will draw from these to argue for and against the practice of lending money at 
interest.  While it is important to understand that usury will always be disputed, 
it is also essential to comprehend that the world is susceptible to change and that 
adjustments can be made accordingly.
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